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This study presents research on credit risk assessment in emerging market countries 
with particular emphasis on the Kenyan and Nigerian markets. Using prior emerging 
market research, information from credit rating agencies and information gained from 
a country visit, a revised methodology is devised. Using this methodology, the 
individual banks scores are in line with the expectations of how they would rank 
relative to each other in terms of qualitative and quantitative factors. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This study aims to provide valuable research into the banking systems of 
selected African emerging markets. It proposes a methodology on the credit 
risk assessment of Kenyan and Nigerian banks from a South African 
perspective. 
1.1 Background 
Emerging markets have attracted a large amount of interest in recent times 
from the developed world and also the new economic power houses of the 
East, namely China and India. The reasons for this new found interest is 
based on the search for better yielding assets from the developed world and 
also the requirement for raw materials from China and India. 
The resurgence of Africa as an emerging market has lagged that of its 
emerging market peers given the histOrically volatile political environment and 
the largely corrupt nature of doing business in the continent. However as 
increased political stability is attained and a greater emphasis is being placed 
on economic reform the interest in Africa as a market has been renewed. 
Due to the above development lag a number of researchers, including the 
Standard Bank Research Division and Noah Research, have started to call 
the African emerging markets "frontier markets" to differentiate them from the 
emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India and China ("BRIC countries"). I 
believe that the description of frontier markets is more appropriate for the 












1.2 Frontier Market Bank Analysis 
Frontier markets have particular and unique characteristics that impact on the 
assessment of the bank credit risk. This places an additional responsibility on 
the assessor of risk to consider and to attempt to mitigate through localised 
information. 
Particular additional risks to be considered are as follows: 
Availability and Reliability of Financial Information 
The timely availability of financial information is crucial in the ongoing risk 
assessment of bank credit risk. Thus the availability, quality and accuracy of 
the financial numbers are an important consideration for an analyst of frontier 
market banks. 
Accounting Standards and Profile of Auditors 
The need to comply with accounting standards leads to additional risk 
resulting in the profile of the auditors of the underlying banks being analysed. 
Important questions to be addressed are who are the auditors and are there 
two auditing firms appointed to ensure complete oversight of processes? One 
would hope that at least one of the auditors is one of the "Big Four" 
comprising PricewaterhouseCoopers; KPMG; Ernst and Young and Deloitte. 
In addition, the credit analyst would have to take a close look at how the 
financial statements are prepared and if they comply with International 
Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS") or the local Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice ("GAAP"). 
Increased Political and Security Risk 
The young democracies that exist in sub-Saharan Africa are fragile at best 
and this is well demonstrated by the political "meltdown" of Kenya since the 
December 2007 elections. This will impact on the risk assessment of the 
banks in terms of how these adverse conditions affect the local market and 
foreign interest in these markets. A good understanding of the government's 












Limited Corporate Governance 
Sub-Saharan African countries have not kept up with the corporate 
governance of the developed world. Thus the controls are not yet up to global 
standards however they are addressing this issue and further improvements 
are expected. 
1.3 Status of Banking in Kenya 
Fitch's update on the Kenyan Banking System is contained in their Country 
Report published in July 2006 (de Bie et ai, 2006). This report provides a 
comprehensive description of the Kenyan banking system together with an 
overview of the banking laws and prudential requirements. 
The banking system of Kenya is still small and undeveloped but is 
deregulated as exchange controls were removed in the late 1990s. The 
banking industry has a state of limited competition due to the fact that the top 
ten banks control over 75 percent of the banking sectors assets. 
The industry is characterised by relatively poor asset quality with the number 
of non-performing loans ("NPls") being high (19,3 percent as at June 2005) 
due to the large influence by government on the state owned banks, inferior 
internal procedures, and no detailed and dynamic risk management process 
(Fitch Ratings, 2006). The government has reduced its ownership of banks 
and now only has active ownership in four banks. Another negative factor that 
affects the level of NPls is the legal environment which does not offer suitable 
nor sufficient protection to lenders (de Bie et ai, 2006). 
Corporate governance has in the past been poorly executed in Kenya 
however the Central Bank of Kenya ("CBK") has been on a quest to improve 
the efficiency and competitiveness of the sector. The CBK have tightened up 
on their supervision of the banks and imposed stiffer penalties upon non-












The principal form of payment remains cash in Kenya owing to the fact the 
informal sector plays a large role in the economy and due to past events the 
public does not have much confidence in the banking sector. These past 
events include numerous malpractices of directed lending, fraud and insider 
abuse (de Bie et ai, 2006). 
Banks in Kenya conform to IFRS disclosure which is crucial in the analysis of 
the information provided. Thus an acceptable level of disclosure is present 
and an analyst would have access to reasonably transparent information. 
The minimum capital requirement in terms of statute is 12 percent (Central 
Bank of Kenya, 2007). de Bie et al (2006) is of the opinion that this level is 
"relatively thin, given the challenging nature of the Kenyan operating 
environment and does not provide an adequate buffer for the banks against 
an adverse shock event in the economy". 
The funding of Kenyan banks is predominantly via demand deposits and as a 
result this leads to a liquidity gap as there is a mismatch between the shorter 
dated liabilities and the short-term assets held by banks as evidenced by the 
table below. The result of this is that the banks are dependent on the rolling 
of these demand deposits in order to fund themselves. 
Table 1 - Kenyan Banks Liquidity Gap: 
Bank Current Assets Current Liabilities Liquidity Gap 
(KES millions as at Dec 2007) 
African Banking Corporation Limited 3231 4451 1220 
Barelavs Bank of Kenva Limited 114946 122533 7587 
Commercial Bank of Africa Limited 21212 36101 14889 
The Co-Operative Bank of Kenya Limited 44965 56244 11279 
Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Limited 25172 29347 4175 
Imperial Bank Limited 6358 7733 1375 
Kenya Commercial Bank Limited 79504 100289 20785 
NIC Bank Limited 23605 25456 1851 
Prime Bank Limited 8324 11143 2819 
Source: Annual F Inanela I Statementa of the above banks 
Kenya has had its share of bank failures and these were typically due to lack 
of market trust and insolvency either from mismanagement or fraud. The 
government has typically responded by only providing assistance to those 












to ensure their survival for the whole banking industry's health (Barako and 
Tower, 2007). 
Barako and Tower (2007) did research on how the issue of corporate 
governance affects the wellness of the Kenyan banking industry. They looked 
at prior data on the bank failures that took place in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s and deducted that these failures could mainly be related to poor 
corporate governance. 
1.4 Status of Banking in Nigeria 
The first banking law was only introduced in 1952 by the then colonial 
government. The country experienced exponential growth in the number of 
banks from 15 banks in 1970 to its peak of 120 banks in 1992 and 1993. The 
increased number of banks was accompanied by an increase in the number of 
branches from the low level of 273 in 1970 to a high of 3 300 in 2004. In 1998 
the number of banks decreased from 115 to 89 due to the liquidation of 26 
banks. Bank failures and liquidations have been a feature of the Nigerian 
industry since 1994 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2007). 
The Central Bank of Nigeria ("CBN") announced that they would be initiating 
reforms to the banking industry in July 2004. This announcement was formally 
communicated in the April - June 2005 publication (Central Bank of Nigeria, 
June 2005). The reforms would be completed in phases and the first phase 
would be to consolidate the number of banks to ensure a stronger industry. 
As with most developing countries the overall rationale for the consolidation 
phase is to ensure that the banking system becomes a catalyst for the 
development of the Nigerian economy as a whole. 
The Nigerian banking industry has in the past being dominated by a large 
number of banks that were essentially poorly capitalised and the asset and 
deposit bases were so small that no meaningful contribution was being made 
to the greater economy. In addition, amongst these numerous banks there 












industry's reputation and lead to wide spread mistrust. The CBN wishes to rid 
the industry of this plight and it is believed that the oversight and monitoring of 
a smaller number of well capitalised banks would be a much easier and more 
efficient process. 
The Industry is concentrated with roughly ten banks accounting for over 50 
percent of the total assets and deposits. Private domestic ownership of banks 
in the industry is 85 percent. Government ownership has been relatively low 
and from January 2006 the government has not had any shareholding in any 
of the banks. Notwithstanding this the government has intervened repeatedly 
in the industry. This is one of the numerous challenges that the industry faces. 
Ezeoha (2007) compiled a comparison between the consolidation in the 
Nigerian industry with the consolidation that took place in the East (Japan, 
Thailand, India and Philippines). The Japan scenario related to pre-war 
Japan and also pre-globalisation. The Japanese banking industry was 
characterized by a large number of small banks and consequently the system 
was unsteady. 
The best fit for comparison was with the consolidation process that occurred 
In both the Philippines and India. Like Nigeria, here the driver was essentially 
to create a stronger and more competitive banking industry to bring about 
economic development (Reyes, 2001 and Talwar, 2001). The first phase of 
the consolidation process has resulted in the number of banks decreasing 
from 89 to 25 in 2006. Thus the industry structure changed from numerous 
fragmented and small banks to one dominated by relatively large publicly 
listed banks and foreign banks. However the industry remains a small player 
in the overall international banking market. 
Ezeoha (2007) also argues that the benefits usually derived from 
consolidation in the more developed world might not be able to be replicated 
due to the structural imbalances that exist within developing markets. He also 
states that the government would have to look at ways to develop the micro 












1.5 Bank Analysis in South Africa 
The many various institutional investors have differing methodologies as to 
the credit assessment of banks. 
. 
One of the major asset management companies focuses on two aspects of 
bank assessment, namely quantitative and qualitative aspects (Sanlam, 2006). 
Their assessment is largely based on the principles set forward by Moody's 
Investors Service ("Moody's") in their bank methodology. In the overall 
assessment quantitative issues account for 70 percent and qualitative issues 
account for the balance of 30 percent. 
The quantitative areas that receive specific attention are asset quality, capital 
adequacy, efficiency, liquidity and profitability. The focus areas of qualitative 
assessment are the change in market share and the stability of earnings 
pattern over time. 
Once all these inputs have been collated the information is inserted into an 
Excel worksheet that covers a rolling 5-year period and an individual bank 
score is obtained. Thereafter, the peak utilization over the past six months is 
obtained for each bank and is multiplied by an appropriate growth percentage 
to obtain the maximum agg egate limit level. Lastly, the maximum aggregate 
limit is multiplied by the individual bank's score to obtain a limit guideline 
figure, on which the proposed limit for each bank is based. 
1.6 Research Question 
The research question is how to develop a qualitative and quantitative 
methodology for the credit analysis of frontier market banks with specific focus 
on Kenya and Nigeria. 
Emerging markets especially in Africa, have recently received increased 
attention from the East. The resource rich economies of Africa have the raw 













South Africa plays a vital role as the access point for the East to many of the 
sub-Saharan countries. In addition, many South African companies are 
looking to expand their operations into Africa where increased returns can be 
achieved. 
Although there is limited past research sufficient information is available to 
provide further and much needed research into this potentially valuable area 












Chapter 2 Literature Review and Macroeconomic 
Information 
The literature review will first look at the three major credit rating agencies and 
how they have prepared their methodologies in order to rate banks across the 
world. Thereafter prior research conducted in other emerging markets that 
can provide invaluable lessons for the assessment of frontier banks will be 
examined. The literature review will be concluded with a discussion of 
corporate governance in emerging and frontier markets. 
2.1 Prior Research 
The information that follows hereunder is a detailed discussion of the how the 
three most respected credit rating agencies rate banks across the world and 
how their methodologies are applied to bank assessment. 
As emerging market research and particularly frontier market financial and 
banking industry research is limited at best, it is prudent that one first looks at 
how the various credit rating agencies assess banks throughout the globe in 
order to provide them with ratings that are consistent and also provide value 
to investors. 
2.1.1 Credit Rating Agency Bank Methodology 
The three major credit rating agencies identified are Standard & Poor's 
("S&P"), Moody's and Fitch Ratings ("Fitch"). These credit rating agencies 
each have a methodology for rating banks. They do not have separate 
methodologies for the developed or emerging world to ensure that ratings are 
consistent over the geographic landscape. 
Fitch (Le Bras and Andrews, 2004) and S&P (Standard & Poor's, Financial 
Institutions Criteria) have not detailed their respective methodologies as 
comprehensively as Moody's (Moody's Investors Service, 2006), however 













Fitch is the credit rating agency that has rated numerous Kenyan banks and 
the country itself. They have also published a paper on the Kenyan Banking 
System (de Bie and Walker, 2007) which is most useful in understanding this 
particular market. 
sap has recently released a bank sector review paper titled "Bank Industry 
Risk Analysis: Boosted by Strong Oil Prices, Nigeria's Economy Buoys Risky 
Banks" (Pirnie et ai, 2008). This paper provides invaluable insights into the 
banking industry in Nigeria and will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
paper. 
The credit rating agencies' methodologies of bank assessment will be 
presented below. 
2.1.1.1 Fitch's Methodology of Rating Banks 
Fitch's methodology (Le ,Bras and Andrews, 2004) centers on the following 
core components: 
Operating Environment and Economic Assessment 
An analysis of the operating environment and the economy in which the bank 
operates is undertaken. This analysis is important as the economic conditions 
present would have an impact on the financial performance of the bank. The 
political risk of the country would also be dealt with in this component. 
Questionnaire 
A detailed questionnaire is presented to each bank and is modified for each 
respective country and for different types of the banks. A written response is 
required from the respective bank prior to any meetings being undertaken. 
The Fitch questionnaire is a sample questionnaire and should be modified to 












The Fitch questionnaire (Fitch Ratings, 2004) covers the following main 
topics: 
1. Market Environment and Planning 
This section deals with the structure of the bank, the bank's main 
business lines and also the development of new products. The 
possibility of future acquisitions is also discussed and the bank's 
competitive position within the industry. The two main drivers of 
banking are also considered here being the state of the bank's staff 
relationships and also the state of their technology systems and 
expenditure on securing the validity of these systems. 
2. Ownership 
The potential for a change of ownership would be explored and also 
the extent of support that the bank would receive from the current 
shareholders would be noted. 
3. Audit/Control by National Banking Supervisorv Authority and Accounts 
A request is made in this section to obtain the latest report by the 
National Bank Supervisor. An understanding is then also requested of 
the accounting convention that is used to draw up and present the 
annual financial statements. 
4. Corporate Governance 
This is a most significant section to be considered and a clear and 
concise approach is necessary to understand the corporate 
governance and how the progression of such will take place. The sub-
sections considered hereunder are not an all inclusive nor an 
exhaustive list: 
(a) Current corporate governance policies 
(b) Board of directors' analysis 
(c) Related party transactions 
(d) Financial statement audit process 
(e) The compensation of senior management 
(f) Share ownership of the directors 
(g) Defensive strategies against takeovers 
(h) Analysis of the complexity of any holding company structures 














This section deals with the detailed analysis of the income and 
expenses of the said bank. The considerations of recurring income 
and the assessment of the capital structure are also based on this 
analysis. The budget for the forthcoming financial year is also 
requested. 
6. Risk 
For obvious reasons risk is a vital section to be analysed and such the 
questions under this section would be most detailed. The following 
sub-sections are covered: 
(a) Management of risk. 
(b) Assessment of the lending and non-lending counterparties. 
(c) Analysis of the contingent and off-balance sheet risks. 
(d) Consideration of the impact of credit derivatives. 
(e) Impact of securitization structures, collateralised debt obligations 
("COOs") and asset backed commercial paper ("ABCP"). 
(f) Assessment of market risk. 
(g) Management of operational risk. 
(h) Any other risks that need to be considered which are unique to the 
bank. 
7. Funding and Liquidity 
This section deals with how funding is managed and also the 
sustainability and thus volatility of such funding. The liquidity mismatch 
is analysed in detail in order to obtain a sense of the size of the 
mismatch and then how this would be funded into the future. 
8. Capital and Loan Loss Reserves 
The section deals with assessing the capital adequacy of the said bank 
and the questions revolve around the issues of core, quasi and hybrid 
capital allocation and reporting. The issue of valuation reserves and 
details of any intangible assets are also analysed. 
9. Insurance Activities 
The questions in this section are only relevant for those banks that 













Fitch uses this opportunity to discuss the information provided and also to 
evaluate the information. The number of meetings is determined by the 
complexity of the bank's operations. 
Bank Analysis 
Two Fitch analysts will evaluate the bank according to: 
• Risk management - included here is the assessment of the bank's risk 
appetite and the systems in place to control the inherent risks. 
• Credit risk - focus is on the loan book and concentrations with specific 
focus on large exposures and industry concentration. 
• Market risk - this covers the structural and trading risks taken on by banks 
and the relevant asset and liability strategies are assessed. 
• Operational risk - prior to Basel II the definition was wide however this has 
since been narrowed down to "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or external events" (Basel II, 
2004, Bank for International Settlements.) 
• Other risk - this primarily relates to the reputation risk and the , , 
maintenance of a sound brand. 
• Funding and liquidity - the focus is on the structure of the bank's funding 
base and the existence of any concentration risk. 
• Capitalization - in times of distress the capital of a bank will play an 
important role in it's ability to absorb losses and thus remain a going 
concern. 
• Securitisation - this funding tool has provided the banks with numerous 
advantages however the structures raise some liquidity issues for action. 
• Earnings - the historical trend and the consistency of earnings through the 
different cycles is important to understand. 
• Market environment - this area of analysis includes looking at the 
operating environment, the economy in general and also the position of the 
bank relative to its peers. 
• Diversification of business and franchise - the analysis would look at the 
relative value of the franchise and the inherent ability to protect its existing 












• Management and strategy - management need to be seen as being 
independent from the major shareholders and their strategy is measured 
against past financial performance. 
• Corporate governance - Fitch views this as an important aspect of the 
analysis as corporate governance can have a material effect on the credit 
quality of a bank. 
• Ownership and control - an assessment is made of the ownership and 
their readiness and capacity to support the bank in a time of need. 
2.1.1.2 sap's Methodology of Rating Banks 
S&P (Standard & Poor's, Financial Institutions Criteria) sets out that that their 
credit analysis of banks covers an extensive collection of qualitative and 
quantitative issues. They do not have a standard scoring method and bank 
ratings would take into consideration the respective country's economic 
situation, legal system, accounting principles, industry competition and the 
regulatory environment. 
The follOwing are the major issues that S&P address in their rating procedure: 
• Economic and industry risk 
• Corporate structure 
• Management and strategy 
• Accounting and financial reporting 
• Management of credit risk 















2.1.1.3 Moody's Methodology of Rating Banks 
Moody's methodology is well explained and comprehensive and is explained 
in greater detail below (Moody's Investors Service, 2006). Moody's detailed 
methodology indicates that a bank's credit risk is derived from essentially 
three elements, namely intrinsic financial strength, the possibility of receiving 
external support from either the owners or government and sovereign risk 
In order to fully consider and understand a bank's credit risk a number of 
fundamental factors should be considered such as brand value, risk 
positioning (business and asset diversification), operating environment 
(strength and prospective performance of the economy), regulatory 
environment (quality and independence of the regulator) and financial 
fundamentals. 
The external factors that have an impact on a bank's financial strength are the 
government's ability to support troubled banks and the risk of a local currency 
deposit freeze and the risk of a foreign currency debt moratorium. 
The fundamental factors are now discussed in greater detail below: 
(a) Brand value 
Historically, Moody's has found that the banks with a strong brand value 
are better positioned to withstand prolonged and difficult market conditions. 
Brand values can be divided into five sub sectors: 
i. Market share and sustainability 
ii. Geographical diversification 
iii. Earnings stability 
iv. Earnings diversification 
v. Vulnerability to event risk 
(b) Risk positioning 
Most of a bank's revenue is derived from rewards for taking calculated 
risks, and thus management's approach to risk taking is crucial and also 













Risk management should have two essential aims of reducing and 
controlling the risks faced and ultimately to take advantage of the risks 
faced when it will be to the benefit of the bank. 
Risk positioning needs to be considered in terms of six sub sectors: 
i. Corporate governance 
ii. Operational risk controls 
iii. Transparent financial reporting 
iv. Credit risk concentration 
v. Liquidity management 
vi. Market risk appetite 
(c) Operating environment 
A bank's performance can be adversely affected by its operating 
environment. For instance violent economic cycles, "business unfriendly 
political decisions" and weak legal systems can affect a bank's 
creditworthiness. The key operating environment measures are economic 
stability, integrity and corruption and the legal system. 
(d) Regulatory environment 
Regulators are required to be independent and credible in their supervision 
and regulation of the banking industry. 
(e) Financial fundamentals 
Research from Moody's indicating that the following financial aspects of 
the banks should be considered: 
i. Sustainable profitability 
ii. Liquidity considerations 
iii. Acceptable level of capital adequacy 
iv. Efficiency 












Moody's (Moody's Investors Service, 2006) highlights the following 
limitations that should be borne in mind when making financial 
assessments: 
• Where banks are active in the securitisation market, the off-balance 
sheet assets are much higher and as such their profit and capital 
ratios may be overstated. Once securitised, these assets do not 
pose further on-balance sheet risk to the banks as opposed to off-
balance sheet derivative exposure. 
• Ratios are static and historical, and thus when calculating bad debts 
as a percentage of the loan portfolio it is dangerous to assume that 
the new loans will perform better. It is only once the portfolio is 
"seasoned" that losses or non-performing loans begin to show. Thus 
banks with swift loan growth could reflect a stronger level of asset 
quality than is actually true in reality. 
• Statistics can be misleading as they do not consider the links that 
exist between various aspects of the business. For instance, when 
one sees that the net interest margin increasing one would assume 
that this is a positive improvement but it could also reflect a 
management change to a higher risk appetite (which would reflect in 
the asset mix/quality but only at a later stage). 
2.1.2 Consolidation and Market Structure in Emerging Market 
Banking Systems 
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") published a working paper in 
November 2002 that dealt with the consolidation and structure of emerging 
market banking systems. The paper was written by Gelos and Roldos and 
focused on emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Central Europe 
(Gelos and Roldos, 2002). This research paper has significant implications 
for Frontier Africa which has lagged the rest of its emerging market peers due 
to the large scale political instability and wars that have been fought on the 
continent. Frontier Africa relates to all sub investment grade African countries 
that are now engaging with credit rating agencies to obtain country ratings and 












The study covers the 1990s and reflects that during this time a large amount 
of consolidation took place within the banking industry in these regions. The 
concern was that the consolidation would lead to decreased competitiveness 
due to fewer banks operating in the regions. The study finds that no decrease 
in competitiveness occurred and this was due to the lower barriers to entry by 
allowing foreign banks to enter these markets. 
Emerging market consolidation does have certain distinguishing 
characteristics that differ from developed markets. Cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions account for a large percentage of emerging market consolidations 
and the consolidation is usually as a result of some kind of financial 
predicament. Unlike in developed markets where market forces play an 
overriding role, it is usual for the authorities in emerging markets to play the 
dominant role. 
2.1.3 Financial Credit Methodology in the Developing World 
A most informative paper was written in 2007 by Das and Ghosh. The paper 
dealt with examining the causes of credit risk in the state owned banks in 
India. Das and Ghosh (2007) pointed out that past literature has not 
adequately addressed the question of credit risks in emerging economies. 
Their paper provides a number of key areas that should be considered when 
analyzing credit risks in emerging markets. Even though the paper focuses 
on state-owned Indian banks the outcomes are regarded as having 
application to banks in the rest of the developing world, and espeCially in 
Africa. 
The maintenance of the strength of the financial markets in developing 
countries is a major consideration for the authorities as any failures can 
dislocate any development progress being made by these countries. 
Lindgren et ai, (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel, (2003) explained that the 
Asian banking crisis in the late 1990's resulted from many years of inadequate 












brisk lending growth and extreme risk been taken on. Their research clearly 
provided evidence of the important role that credit risk plays in the economy in 
general. 
Das and Ghosh's (2007) review of the literature revealed that there were a 
few theoretical explanations as to the reasons for the difference in various 
banks' credit policies. From these explanations the following pertinent points 
were raised: 
• Executive Compensation - this relates to the age old dilemma of the 
"principal-agenf problem where executives with limited liability support 
high-risk strategies to maximize short-term benefits. 
• Strong competition - this aspect places increased pressure on profits and 
the growth of loan books might be pushed too hard to compensate for the 
decline in profits. The end result would probably lead to increased NPLs 
at a future date. 
• "Herd behaviour" in which bank executives consider clients as creditworthy 
just because other banks are lending to them. This form of "discretionary" 
lending is made without any form of quantitative or informed analysis. 
However to be wrong when everyone is wrong also does not carry the 
same consequences as if you were wrong in isolation. 
• Collateral values can also be a contributing factor to increased NPLs as 
during sound economic times the values of collateral would increase and 
lending activity would also Increase based on the higher asset values. 
When the economy takes a tum for the worse the impact on NPLs could 
be magnified as the underlying asset values begin to deteriorate. 
The above theoretical explanations do make sense however there is 
unfortunately inadequate practical research to corroborate them. Available 
research focuses mainly on the US banking industry and no emerging market 
research is available. Berger and DeYoung (1997) looked at US bank data 
from 1985 to 1994 and concluded that increases in NPLs are positively 
correlated to a decrease in cost efficiency (Berger AN and DeYoung R, 1997). 












amounts on monitoring and ongoing risk management and these activities are 
typically value destroyers. 
Kwan and Eisenbis (1997) concluded from their study of US banks from 1986 
to 1995 that banks that were more inefficient took more credit risk. 
A study done on the Mexican banking sector by Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al 
(1997) concluded that the probability of banking failure in Mexico was more 
pronounced in the banks that had a higher proportion of NPLs to total loans. 
The research in India (Das et ai, 2007) is particularly relevant as it is an 
important developing world country and it has a long history of banking 
controls. These controls have been loosened since economic reforms were 
introduced in the 1990's allowing market forces to come to the fore. Pertinent 
aspects of the Indian research that could be applied to other developing 
countries were identified to be the following: 
• There is a positive overlap between the GOP growth variable and 
percentage of NPLs and this suggests that problem loans are cyclical yet 
with a lag. 
• Ownership structures also impact on the risk appetite that a bank would 
have. State-owned or family owned banks typically have higher risk 
appetites. 
• Hasty advances growth is a crucial determinant for future NPL growth 
especially when competition is fierce during good economic times and 
loans are made to people with lower repayment ability than normal in order 
to maintain market share. 
• Inefficient banks normally have poor screening techniques and monitoring 
of loans will also be inadequate leading to a substandard book quality. 
• The quandary of NPLs within the Indian state-banks has a long history 
steeped in the weaknesses in the existing debt recovery processes, poor 
legal processes especially with regards to foreclosures and execution of 
court orders. This would result in the quantum of NPLs remaining "sticky" 
from one year to the next as they cannot be written down and are carried 












Oas and Ghosh (2007) methodology is centred on the following variables: 
• Real GOP growth - they use the current figure plus the previous year's 
figure in order to assess the timing. 
• Reat advances growth - the time· period this variable is tracked over varies 
from one to four years. 
• Number of branch increases - this variable is included to measure how 
well management controls the growth rate of branches in new 
geographical areas. 
• Operating expenses to total assets ratio - this gives an indication of the 
efficiency or inefficiency of the bank. If the ratio is high then management 
would not be able to extract additional benefits out of a larger branch and 
staff compliment. 
• Bank size - this is taken into account via a natural logarithm of total assets. 
The rationale is that large banks could be in a position to have improved 
management of NPLs through diversification benefits applicable to their 
loan portfolios. 
• Executive incentives - these are addressed through the ratio of interest 
income less interest expense divided by total assets. The period that this 
ratio is lagged is between two and three years due to the fact that if the net 
interest margin is reduced that might change the credit risk policy of the 
bank and thus make it take on more risk. 
• Capital adequacy - this is monitored and lagged between two and three 
years. The ratio used is Tier I and Tier II capital divided by risk weighted 
assets. This variable does not have a definite outcome as the higher 
capital adequacy ratio could be both a disincentive to take additional risk 
and an incentive to chase increased profits from a high risk - high return 
strategy. 
• Risk premium - this is defined as income from loans divided by total loans 
less the call money rate. This variable is considered to take into account 
the higher interest rate charged for the higher risk taken. Intuition would 
expect this variable to be positive however if large scale cross-













Some of the results obtained from the Indian model are interesting and could 
have an insightful view on possible results to be obtained from the Kenyan 
and Nigerian markets. Quickening growth in GDP will initially bring about 
declining NPL's but once this growth slows or a recession occurs the quantum 
of NPLs increases quite rapidly. Thus the old adage that most problem loans 
are written in good times would seem to hold true. The results indicate the 
over extension of credit has an implicit and quick impact on increasing the 
number of NPLs, usually within the first year of credit extension. Strangely 
enough the composition of the loan portfolio also influenced NPLs negatively 
and defaults for the corporate market were an issue. The large banks also 
suffered from a portfolio quality standpoint having more NPLs than their 
smaller peers. The variables of branch expansion, operating expenses and 
interest margins did not have a material impact on NPLs (Das et ai, 2007). 
The ownership consideration of banks was also an issue that was taken into 
consideration when looking at the credit risk app tite and approach to the 
management of this appetite. 
Himmelberg, et al (1999) did their research in the United States and found 
evidence that diverse ownership structures and corporate governance policies 
lead to different risk profiles amongst banks. 
2.1.4 Corporate Governance in the Developing World 
Corporate governance is the intricate relationship between the various parties 
in the banking industry and includes shareholders, board of directors, 
management, the depositors and government. The vast amount of· 
consolidation amongst banks both within individual countries and across 
country borders has made the issue of corporate governance even more 
important. 
It is a generally accepted fact that corporate governance in many developing 
countries is weak. This weakness is influenced by the lack of readily available 
and comparable information, limited experience from market participants and 












largely due to political corruption and the inherent weakness in a less than 
impartial judiciary. Compounding the above problem is that the accounting 
disclosure in some frontier countries is not yet at international standards and 
the disclosure is not as transparent as is required. 
Corporate governance is even more crucial within the banking industry given 
that banks typically have a large and diverse number of shareholders and the 
systemic risk is higher. Hassan et al (2004) stated that "corporate governance 
is about authority, transparency, accountability, stewardship, leadership, 
direction and control." 
Fitch published a Special Report in August 2006 titled Corporate Governance 
in Emerging Market Banks, in which it looks at the improvements made in 
emerging market bank corporate governance (Gandy et ai, 2006). The report 
indicates that corporate governance does exist in emerging markets however 
the strength of the new and improved processes will only be tested in a 
downturn. In order for corporate governance in the banking system to be 
effective the following key elements are required: 
• An independent and well working judiciary system. 
• The bank regulators need to be independent and well qualified. 
• The regulators must be able to reprimand and fine banks that are non-
compliant. Enforcement of penalties is crucial to ensure that the regulator 
is not seen as a "toothless dog" and thus retain the credibility of the 
regulator (Gandy et ai, 2006). 
Fitch (Gandy et ai, 2006) identifies that there are three levels of governance 
that need to be considered and these are political (government), the banking 
system and ultimately the individual banks. Given the peculiarities of 
emerging markets the main pitfalls of corporate governance are the number of 
related party transactions and a lack of experience and proficiency of 
regulators to challenge and sanction offending banks. Another consideration 
is the level of state ownership or political influence that is exerted over the 












According to Fitch's research there is sufficient data to indicate that poor 
corporate governance is directly related to a number of emerging market 
banking systems that have either come close to failing or have failed. 
However for the period 2000 to 2005 the data has indicated that there has 
been a vast improvement of corporate governance and is regarded as being a 
direct response to countries that are developing their economies to be more 
market orientated (Gandy et ai, 2006). Although the improvements have been 
welcomed there is a still a distance to go to reach developed world standards 
and corporate governance constrains many of the banks that Fitch rates in 
emerging markets. 
The major stumbling block for emerging market countries is that whilst they 
adopt sound corporate governance measures it is the implementation of these 
that still remains a huge challenge. This stems directly from a lack of skills 
and experience within the banking system. Emerging markets face a problem 
of ensuring that the board of directors is independent and as such face the 
prospect that boards are controlled either by government or a controlling, 
"elite" family. 
Fitch highlighted the problem of "crony capitalism" during the Asian financial 
debacle in 1997 in which relationship-based corporate governance rules were 
adhered to instead of rules-based corporate governance. An important aspect 
that serves to reduce the amount of related party transactions is the 
emergence of a well organized and functioning capital market industry as 
related parties are usually able to borrow at more beneficial rates from the 
capital markets (Gandy et ai, 2006). 
Financial reporting and audit oversight are also important corporate 
governance issues that are of relevance in emerging markets. Most emerging 
markets where the banks are listed have adopted IFRS. Despite this adoption 
Fitch has found that local interpretation can differ from country to country and 













The "Big Four" accounting firms are present in most emerging markets 
however they themselves face a huge obstacle of either: 
• Training the local staff up to the required international standard of skills 
sets and after that in retaining them; or 
• If they have to use foreign staff that these staff are well versed in the local 
language and have an understanding of the various loopholes that may 
exist in the local market. 
In the smaller emerging countries it is normal for one audit firm to audit all the 
banks in the said country. Given these circumstances the requirement that 
the auditing and advisory duties remain as far as possible independent would 
apply, however problems are likely to occur. 
Arun and Turner (2004) point out in their paper that there are some stumbling 
blocks to the preference of prudential guidelines over economic regulations. 
They also argue that the increased competition that foreign banks bring to 
emerging markets could be a crucial way to rapidly bring emerging market 
banks' corporate governance up to world class standards. The reasons for 
the limited application of prudential supervision are due to: 
• The cost of raising capital being punitive in developing countries and their 
capital requirements being higher due to the increased risk 
• There not being enough skilled supervisors to carry out their roles 
effectively 
• Regulators not generally being independent from political influence. 
• The lack of timely and accurate financial information, which is required. 
Allowing foreign banks to operate in emerging markets could lead to an 
overall more stable industry. An empirical study complied by Levine (1999) 
provides evidence that foreign banks reduce the occurrence of banking crises 
and assist in the local banks achieving greater prudential well ness. The 
counter argument from emerging market governments is that the large scale 
infiltration of foreign banks will weaken their ability to use the banking system 












Adelegan (2006) did some research into the Nigerian banking industry and his 
empirical findings were that the percentage of non-executive directors 
exceeded the percentage of executive directors. With regards to the 
chairman and chief executive officer positions these were occupied by 
different individuals and the segregation of duties was intact. 
The auditing firms in Nigeria also provide advisory services to their clients and 
thus the establishment of audit committees since 1991 has ensured the 
independence of the audit process. In addition, eighty percent of the audit 
committees had non-executive chairmen. The quality of the financial 
information provided by the auditors is also an important consideration. The 
auditors generally have long term relationships with the banks and the 
average audit term is 12.5 years. This may adversely affect the auditor's 
independence. 
The factors negatively affecting the performance of banks are a relatively 
underdeveloped capital market, the small number of banks listed on the stock 
exchange and a lack of a lively market encouraging corporate controls.The 
ownership of banks plays a crucial role in assessing the credit risks as those 
banks that have either government or board members as owners display 
poorer financial performance. The reason is that the managers of the banks 
do not have the ability to manage without substantial influences from owners 
relating to operational decisions. 
2.2 Macroeconom ic Information 
The following section will deal with the macroeconomic position in Kenya and 
Nigeria. The factors to be considered include a description of the economy, 
monetary policy, government finances, external debt, credit ratings and then 
finally the political arena. 
2.2.1 Kenya 
The following table provides an overview of selected economic data for Kenya 












Table 2 - Selected Kenyan Economic Data: 
Kenya 2003 2004 
Real GOP percent 2,9% 5,1% 
Debt/GOP percent 61,5% 61,2% 
Debt/Revenue 293% 259% 
Inflation (Average) 9,8% 11,6% 
Interest Rates 13,47% 12,25% 
Exchange RatelZAR 0,09 0,07 
Current Account CUSS bn) 0,1 CO,1} 
External Debt CUSS bn) 6,1 6,3 
Forex Reserves (US$ bn) 1,4 1,5 




1 Forecasted figures except for the Credit Ratings. 
Source: Stanblc Bank and IMF. 
Economy 
2005 2006 2007 F 1 
5,7% 6,1% 7,1% 
53,8% 49,6% 43,6% 
238% 231% 203% 
10,3% 14,5% 9,8% 
13,16% 13,74% 13,32% 
0,09 0,10 0,11 
(0,3) 10,5} 111 
6 6,6 7,2 
1,8 2,4 2,9 
Not rated 
Not rated 8 8 
Not rated 8+ 
Kenya is a relatively diversified, open economy even though agriculture plays 
a large role. After South Africa, Kenya has second lowest export 
concentration in sub Saharan Africa. Prior to the post election chaos tourism 
also played a key role in the economy (Mhango, 2008). 
Economic growth has been strong and averaged close to six percent for the 
period 2004 to 2006. The fastest growing sector was the services sector 
which includes tourism, transport and communication and retail. 
Monetarv Policy 
The principal objective of monetary policy in Kenya is the achievement of 
sustainable low inflation and the CBK's use of interest rates as its principal 
weapon. The CBK has a target objective for monetary policy of inflation below 
five percent. However the inflation rate that the CBK uses is one that 
excludes related seasonal food cycles and fuel costs and is referred to as 
underlying inflation. This underlying inflation figure increased from five 
percent to seven percent. In the CBK's April 2008 Press Release they 
concluded as follows: "The Central Bank is confident that the inflation rate will 












is currently being driven by transitory supply shocks rather than monetary 
overhang problems in the economy." 
The average inflation numbers in Table 2 have not netted off the related food 
seasonal cycles and fuel costs and thus are the gross numbers. 
Government Finances 
Government funding has been steadily decreasing from the prior high levels in 
the mid 1990s largely due to the lower budget deficits and the recent faster 
growth in the economy (Mhango, 2008). The percentage of debt to GOP has 
fallen to 43.6 percent and this is close to the median of BB rated credits and B 
rated credits that did not receive any benefit from debt reduction. 
External Debt 
External debt has remained relatively stable and is in the middle range of its 
peers. The IMFIWorid Bank Joint Debt Sustainability Analysis judged Kenya 
to be at a low risk of debt distress. Prior to the election and ensuing violence, 
a debut Eurobond was planned for the first quarter of 2008 (this is highly 
unlikely to happen and has not occurred to date). 
Credit Ratings 
S&P's has rated Kenya as a B flat which places it as a speculative grade 
country. Fitch only rated the Republic of Kenya on the 12th December 2007 
and assigned the country a rating of B+. On the 30th January 2008 Fitch 
changed Kenya's outlook to negative due to the continued unrest in the 
country which brings with it an economic cost. Peers in this rating band 
include Cape Verde, Ghana, Jamaica and Mongolia. 
Political Arena 
Nine weeks of political wrangling over the disputed December 2007 elections 
eventually lead to a power sharing agreement being signed by President 












The salient features of the power sharing agreement (known as the National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008) that came into being on the 28th 
February 2008 are as follows: 
• Creation of an Executive Prime Minister position. The position is to be 
held by Ralia Odinga. 
• The Prime Minister will be an elected member of legislature and 
parliamentary leader of the largest party in the legislature. 
• Each member of the coalition must elect one Member of Parliament for 
one of the two Deputy Prime Minister positions. 
• The cabinet will consist of the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, 
two Deputy Prime Ministers and other Ministers. 
• The make up of the coalition government must always take into 
account the principle of portfolio balance and reflect the coalition 
partners' representation in parliament. 
• The coalition will be dissolved if the current parliament is dissolved, if 
the parties agree in writing or if one party withdraws from the coalition. 
• The National Accord and Reconciliation Act will be promulgated in law. 
Only time, will tell if the well crafted written agreement can be in fact be 
honoured in practice. All early indications are that the leadership of both 
parties is choosing to reconcile and commit to the power sharing agreement. 
2.2.2 Nigeria 
The following table provides an overview of selected economic data for 
Nigeria and a discussion on the data will follow thereafter. 
Table 3 - Selected Nigerian Economic Data: 
Nigeria 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GOP percent 10,3% 10,6% 5,4% 6,2% 6,4% 
Debt/GOP percent 45,7% 38,8% 16,4% 2,1% 2% 
Inflation (Average) 14% 15% 17,8% 8,3% 5,5% 
Interest Rates 9,5% 
Exchange Rate/ZAR 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,06 
Current Account (US$ bn) 4,3 8 13,8 1,3 
External Debt (US$ bn) 30,9 35,9 20,5 3,5 3,3 












Nigeria 2003 I 2004 I 2005 I 
Credit Ratings - Foreign Cun-ency Long-term 
Moody's Not rated 
S&P 
Fitch 
1 Forecasted figures except for the Credit Ratings. 
Source: Stanblc Bank and IMF. 
Economy 
2006 I 2007 
I BB 
I BB-
The Nigerian economy is the fourth largest economy in Africa behind South 
Africa, Egypt and Algeria. Nigeria's nominal GOP increased by 27 percent 
from Nigerian Niaira (liN") 14 735 in 2005 to N18 710 in 2006. Nigeria is 
Africa's largest producer of oil and the eleventh largest global producer. Oil 
and gas account for roughly 22 percent of the Nigeria's 2006 GOP. The 
Nigerian GOP is constrained by the unrest that frequently occurs in Niger 
Delta, an important oil producing region (Munyama, 2008). 
The non-energy sectors have also been growing well and these sectors 
recorded real growth of nine and a half percent in 2007. Standard Bank 
Research expects growth of nine percent in 2008 (Munyama, 2008). The 
sectors driving the majority of the growth are transport, telecommunications, 
construction and general industrial equipment. 
The abovementioned sectors are benefiting from the government's 
infrastructure spend in order to alleviate the massive need of improving the 
country's poor infrastructure. The poor infrastructure relates predominantly to 
the roads and power situation. Thus although the real GOP grew by five 
percent in 2007, this figure was disappointing as the true potential of the 
economy and country as a whole is to deliver growth of a much greater 
multiple. Nigeria remains a poor country with over seventy percent of the 
population living in poverty. In addition the decrepit infrastructure, security 
and corruption concerns and fragile public institutions also retard the potential 













Stanbic Bank Research in their Blueprint for Nigeria in January 2008 forecast 
that inflation would "remain in single digits throughout 2008" (Munyama, 2008). 
Towards the end of 2007 the inflation figure started to increase and in the last 
half of 2007 the Central Bank of Nigeria increased their monetary policy rate 
by 150 basis points. 
The Nigerian Government has decided to distribute excess oil income to the 
country's states in local currency rather than in United States dollars. It is 
anticipated that this will place upward pressure on interest rates, together with 
the increased food inflation. 
Stanbic Bank anticipates that the monetary policy rate will increase by one 
percentage point to 10.5 percent in 2008 and then by a further one percent to 
11.5 percent in 2009 (Munyama, 2008). 
Government Finances 
The Nigerian Government has committed itself to follow a sensible fiscal 
program and the President has endorsed the Fiscal Responsibility Bill. This 
bill forms the foundation of the financial program of the Government. The 
above bill also ensures that the annual budget is presented with a three year 
medium term financial strategy. The 2008 budget is focused on building 
physical and human infrastructure to rapidly reduce poverty in the country. 
The economy of Nigeria remains heavily weighted towards oil revenue, and 
this revenue source accounts for 80 percent of all revenue. The Nigerian 
Government is acutely aware that it needs to foster a suitable climate so that 
the reliance on oil can be decreased to a lower level. The budget deficit is 
expected to be N560 billion which accounts for two and a half percent of gross 
domestic product. 
External Debt 
External debt as a percentage of gross domestic product has reduced rapidly 












In October 2005 the Paris Club and the Nigerian Government reached an 
agreement whereby Nigeria repurchased its debt owed to the Paris Club at a 
discount of 60 percent. In April 2006, Nigeria became the first African country 
to fully redeem its debt with the Paris Club. This was achieved by using their 
substantial oil profits to repay an estimated total sum of US$30 billion. 
External debt as a percentage of gross domestic product is forecasted to 
remain at low levels of below three percent into the future as oil revenues 
remain strong and external debt is not excessive. 
Credit Ratings 
S&P has rated Nigeria as a BB- on a foreign currency basis and a BB flat on a 
local currency basis which places it as a speculative grade country. Fitch 
rated Nigeria as a BB- country on both a foreign and local currency basis. 
The outlook for both rating agencies is stable. Peers in this rating band 
include Armenia, Indonesia, Lesotho, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela 
and Vietnam. 
Political Arena 
Nigeria's new President, Umaru Yar'Adua, took office in April 2007. The 
OPPOSition parties disputed the election victory, however the courts upheld the 
election results. Since assuming office President Yar' Adua has been intent on 
ensuring the "rule of law" and is also the driving force behind the process of 
stamping out corruption in the public service sectors. 
Nigeria is a country with high poverty and also a large number of religious and 
ethnic groups which pose significant social problems that the current 
administration will have to face. 
2.3 Country Visit Information 
A country visit was undertaken in October 2008 to Kenya. On this visit 
meetings were held with the Central Bank of Kenya to deal speCifically with 
the issue of corporate governance and bank supervision. In addition, 












with regards to the bank questionnaire and to obtain general information from 
the respective banks. 
2.3.1 Kenya 
On a recent country visit to Kenya additional and valuable information was 
obtained through meeting with the Central Bank and also various commercial 
banks. The meeting with the CBK focused solely on obtaining information on 
corporate governance and bank supervision. The commercial banks had 
been e-mailed the bank questionnaire prior to the meetings and the focus of 
the meeting was to extract as much information as possible from these 
meeting with reference to the questionnaire. 
Central Bank of Kenya Meeting: 
The meeting was held with the Assistant Director of Bank Supervision and two 
Bank Supervision Managers. The frankness and openness of the interaction 
was surprising as resistance was expected due to a previous experience with 
a meeting held with the Bank of Botswana ("BOB") earlier in the year. At this 
meeting with BOB, great resistance was encountered in obtaining answers to 
questions posed which were similar to the Kenyan questions and also covered 
the same issues regarding corporate governance and bank supervision. 
The meeting was most fruitful and the level of corporate governance imposed 
on the banking in Kenya was surprising. The following are the key points 
gained from the meeting: 
• Corporate governance is of prime importance to the CBK. 
• The supervision of banks starts from the initial phase of licensing the 
banks which are subject to strict rules. In addition, the CBK vets the 
shareholders and directors. 
• Maximum shareholding allowed is 25 percent after approval has been 
gained from CBK. Executive individual shareholding of banks cannot 












• Any non-compliance of rules and regulations are subject to a penalty of 
KES1 million, after the offending bank has been given an opportunity to 
rectify such a breach within 30 days. 
• Annual visits are conducted at the banks by the CBK where audits are 
carried out. In addition, CBK does an annual review of the banking licence. 
• Consolidation of banks to a smaller number would be the preferred option 
for the industry, however this would not be a forced situation but rather 
encouraged in a natural and controlled manner. 
• CBK wishes to raise the minimum capital requirement to KES 1 billion. 
Thus one might see some consolidation I mergers amongst the weaker tier 
three banks to meet these requirements. The number of banks could 
reduce by at least three or four. 
• Family owned banks from CBK's experience generally have sound 
financials but are weak in terms of corporate governance. 
• Banks have to publicly publish their financial results every quarter after 
agreement with CBK and the auditors. 
• Audit firm performance is monitored closely with certain restrictions in 
place. The appOintment of an audit partner in charge of a bank audit is 
limited to a five year period with that respective bank. In addition, 
business declarations are obtained from the audit firm relating to their 
dealings with the bank that they are auditing. 
• Once a CBK audit of a bank has been completed, then a special board 
meeting of the audited bank is called. At this meeting the CBK presents 
its findings to the board of directors and each board member has to sign 
that they have read and understood the findings and accept any CBK 
recommendations. 
• Directors and senior management of banks are only allowed to have a 
house and car loan from the bank. These loans also have to be fully 
secured. All such loans have to be approved by the full board and 
submitted to the CBK within seven days of granting such loans. 
• The judicial system remains a problem in the frustration of recovery of 
securities. The bulk of this problem stems from the perfection of securities 













• CBK encourages banks to move to a cash flow approach to lending, 
whereby security is not the sole reason in granting the loan. When non-
performing loans are identified provisions are immediately raised. Should 
these loans have any security it is taken into account however the security 
value is discounted over a five year period, thus for each year the value of 
the security declines by 20 percent. 
• The Minister of Finance has ceded certain duties to the CBK. Thus they 
are now considered to be operationally independent from Government but 
they are still the force together with National Treasury that drives the 
Kenyan economy. 
• Banks are Basel I compliant. CBK has to change their banking legislation 
to ensure that Basel II compliance can be implemented. This relates to 
establishing a framework for calculating a capital charge for market risk. 
• A Credit Reference Bureau is also being set up within the country which 
will provide valuable information. 
• CBK has debtor insurance in place for all deposits up to KES100 000. 
Commercial Bank Meetings: 
Meetings were held with the following Kenyan commercial banks: 
• Commercial Bank of Africa ["CBA"] (Tier 1 bank) 
• Diamond Trust Bank ["Diamond Trust"] (Tier 2 bank) 
• NIC Bank ["NIC"] (Tier 1 bank) 
• K-Rep Bank [K-Rep"] (Tier 3 bank) 
The above two tier 1 banks each have their own distinctive niche markets on 
which they concentrate. CBA is a privately owned bank that concentrates on 
the corporate sector and this sector accounts for 60 percent of profits. NIC 
has the main focus on asset finance and comprises 35 percent of their 
business. NIC was the only bank that completed our questionnaire prior to 
our meeting. 
Diamond Trust is a bank that focuses on the retail segment of the economy 













K-Rep started as a non governmental organization in 1984 and became a 
commercial bank in 1999. K-Rep's business was dominated by micro finance, 
which accounted for 75 percent of their business. Their mission is to reduce 
poverty. Their business model is based on a group lending basis. The loans 
are mainly "character loans" as the group's members provide guarantees for 
each other. The group's size is typically thirty individuals with six subsets of 
five people. 
2.3.2 Nigeria 
A country visit to Nigeria was unfortunately not possible due to the worsening 
global credit markets in the latter half of 2008. The result of which demanded 
more attention to the international banks and also the local ba ks to a lesser 
degree. A country visit will still likely be undertaken but only after the 












Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
The first step in this ch<lpter will be to devise a questionnaire for the 
commerGial b<lnks operating in Kenya and Nigeria, The Fitch Ratings 
questionnaire used ror bank meetings will be used as the base for a new 
questionnaire developed specifiGally for the above two frontier markets 
Speculative mted frontier countries like Kenya and Nigeria will require th<lt the 
questionnaire is more focused on issues of corpora te governanGe flmnClal 
integrity and controls whiGh woukllimit the occurrences of fraud or corruption 
The other issues of inherent fimnci<ll strength and risk managemen t will also 
receive due attention 
3.1 Questionnaire for Commercial Banks 
The questionnaire 'Nill have both qU<llitative and quantitative questions 
Qwnership: 
1. Who are the top f ive shareholders of the bank and what are their 
respective perGenl<lge holrlings'! (Provide an organogram of the bank' s 
ownership strLlCture) 
2, If privately owned, please provide detailed information of other business 
interests that these individuats or families have? 
3 Wh<lt perGent<lge of the bank is state owned? 
Mark.lliJt!ckgrQl!lld' 
1. In which business segments does the bank hold a dominant market share? 
2. Which are the main markets that the bank operates in? 
3. List the bank's five most profitable business lines over the past three years. 
4. The current glob<ll credit crundl wilt have a negative impact on the bank's 
profitability. 
! , , , , , " j Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Not Applic~ble Agree 












1. What is the bank's corporate governance pOlicy? 
2. What definition does the bank use in referring to independent directors? 
3. Provide details of the governance structure, including: 
(a) The names of the directors; 
(b) The roles of the directors (e.g. Chairman, CEO, Finance Director, etc); 
(c) Executive or non-executive status; 
(d) Whether the directors are independent; 
(e) Details of any sub-committees and their members and 
(f) Curriculum Vitae of all directors. 
4. Provide details of any commercial relationships between the bank and any 
of its directors. 
5. Give details of any directorship's in the bank's clients held by the bank's 
directors. 
6. If the bank has an audit committee, 
(a) For how many years has the audit committee been in place? 
(b) How many members of the audit committee are independent? 
(c) To whom does the audit committee report? 
7. Does the bank have a policy on related party transactions? If yes, then: 
(a) Provide a copy of this policy. 
(b) What percentage of total capital is attributable to related party loans? 
(c) What level of authority approves these loans? 
(d) Give details of any related party transactions that are not at arm's 
length? 
8. If the bank has a compensation/remuneration committee, 
(a) How many members of the compensation committee are independent? 
(b) How many members of the committee are non-executive? 
(c) What factors are the bank's executive remuneration performance 
based on? 













(e) Does the bank have closed periods I transactional lock-outs prior to the 
release of interim and annual financial statements? If yes, then: 
I. How long is the closed period? 
II. Which department monitors compliance with the regulation? 
9. Provide details of any fraudulent activity during the last three years and the 
related losses suffered by the bank. 
RiSk Management 
1. The bank's risk assessment methods am strategies are in line with the 
risk appetite of the bank. 
, , , , , 
---_. 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree Disagr •• Not Applicable 
Agree 
~~ . --
2. When the bank takes security, what classes does the bank find 
acceptable? 
3. What recovery margins are applied to each class of securi ty? 
4. What is the definition that the bank uses to describe its non-performing 
loans? 
5. On what basis is the loan loss provision calculated? 
6. How does the bank treat restructured loans? Please provide details of any 
restructured loans? 
7. The ongoing risk management function is a separate function from the 
credit origination function. 
, , , , , 
Disagree Not Applicable Strongly Agree I Strongly Disagree 
'--'AO'"'·'" __ -" ________ -' __ ___ 
8. What is the bank's success rate for collections and recoveries from non-
performing loans over a three year period? 
9 The bank has issued hybrid capital instruments, such as hybrid tier 1 and 
tier 2 capital instruments. ,- , , , ; , , 
~---














1. Does your bank operate in the credit derivative business? If yes, then: 
(a) For what period has the bank been active in this market? 
(b) What was the annual growth rate of the credit derivative business for 
the last three years? 
(c) Quantify any operational losses arising from the credit derivative 
business over the last three years? 
Securitisation Structures: 
1. Has the bank securitised any of its assets? If yes, then: 
(a) What is the strategy behind the bank securitising the assets? 
(b) What amount of funding would the bank require should these assets 
have to be brought back onto the bank's balance sheet? 
2. Does the bank invest in other entities' securitisation programs? If yes, 
then: 
(a) Does the bank have a preference for the lower risk and highly rated 
tranches or for the higher risk and lower rated tranches? 
Conduit Structures: 
1. Does the bank have any conduits? If yes, then: 
(a) What is the current total value of the paper issued to the market 
through this vehicle? 
(b) What has been the annual growth rate in the conduit's size for the last 
three years? 
(c) Give details of any liquidity facility provided by the bank to its own 
conduit or any other conduit 
(d) What amount of funding would the bank require should these assets 
have to be brought back onto the bank's balance sheet? 
Market Risk: 
1. How does the bank measure its market risk? Does it use the concept of 
Value at Risk ("VAR") or a similar concept? 













3. Does the bank apply stress testing to the valuations? 
4. Which of the following market risks poses the greatest risk to the bank, 
and why? 
• Interest Rate Risk 
• Currency Risk 
• Equity Risk 
Operational Risk: 
1. Define operational risk for the bank's purposes? 
2. Please provide details of any operational losses recorded by the bank over 
the past three years. 
Bancassurance Activities: 
1. Does the bank have a dedicated insurance business? If yes, then: 
(a) How is this business accounted for in the bank's AFS? 
(b) How much profit does the insurance business contribute? 
(c) What is the market share of the insurance business? 
Borrowing disclosure between the Commercial banks: 
1. To what extent does the bank borrow from other Commercial banks? 
2. To what extent does the bank lend to other Commercial banks? 
3. How are these exposures accounted for? 
4. Does the Central Bank regulate these exposures? 
5. Are these exposures reported monthly to the Central Bank? 
3.2 Proposed Methodology 
The proposed methodology is based on both qualitative and quantitative 
factors and uses the Moodys methodology as a base. This base has been 
adapted to cater for the requirements of frontier African countries. See Table 
4 below for a tabular representation of the proposed methodology. The 
weightings for frontier market banks would be 40 percent towards qualitative 












Table 4 - Frontier Country Bank Methodology: 
1=IOv"'~1 w.ght WeIght 1 Sub-.I Overall w ..... ht Weight 
,% 
Governance 40.00% 16.00% I> Ex8CIJI\lll 
,% 
I Qualitative Factors 40% -40.00% 16.00% rOlliI AUeIl : __ n_v. __ = IIm .. .,ess ,.~ IFInenc ... R_ 10.00% 4.00% r-
11 10.00% 4.00% _Bank 
r-
;... 
15.00% 9.00% ilMll'8tlna Droll t Drior to I ess81s ... letlncanebel Ore taxltcUI income 
II Quanltatlve Fectora .Jauldltv 22.50% 13.50% otaI Deooslll , ToIIIIloans 110 13.50% 80% le .... l. 22.50% 13.50% I .. I Reao!% fj( s.n;"" IAssets 6.75% 
10.00% 6.00% Retia 6.00% 
~Qu.11ty 30.00% 16.00% .08/11 12.60% Chanoal" . Loan Growth 5.40% 
3.2.1 Qualitative Factors 
The qualitative factors would be divided into four broad categories. Under 
each broad category there will be specific focus areas that will require detailed 
analysis. 
The four broad categories are as follows: 
(a) Corporate governance 
(b) Market share 
(c) Financial reporting 
(d) Regulatory environment 
The corporate governance and market share categories will each attract a 
weighting of 40 percent and their overall weighting will be 16 percent. The 16 
percent weighting is the total of the 40 percent category weighting multiplied 
by the 40 percent weighting for qualitative factors. The financial reporting 
and regulatory environment categories will each have a category weight of ten 
percent and their overall weighting will be four percent (ten percent multiplied 
by the 40 percent weight for qualitative factors). 
Corporate governance and market share have been attributed Significantly 
higher weightings as they are considered to be of much higher importance 
than financial reporting and the regulatory environment. The assessment of 
the regulatory environment is also a highly subjective category and thus .its 












Within the above four broad categories there will be further detailed sub-sets 
that will have to be considered. In order to calculate individual bank ratings 
these sub-sets will be allocated points according to various scales that will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Each category and respective sub-set will be discussed in greater depth and 
the significance of the category will be explained in determining the bank 
rating. 
3.2.1.1 Corporate governance 
This is potentially the most important of the qualitative factors that needs to be 
carefully considered and analysed. The reason for this is that all other factors 
are reliant on sound corporate governance in order for them to have any 
relevance and credibility. 
Corporate governance in frontier markets has lagged other developing 
markets and also the developed markets. In recent years however the frontier 
markets have been attempting to raise their compliance levels for corporate 
governance and the implementation thereof up to global standards. 
Corporate governance is split into four further sub-sets: 
i. Nature of ownership 
The issue of ownership in frontier markets is vitally important as a 
proxy for the risk profile of a particular bank. 
The issues to be considered are the percentage of government 
ownership and whether the bank is largely controlled by a family 
unit. The loan quality from government owned banks has been 
much worse than independent banks and thus the risks of default of 
these government controlled banks would be that much more 
pronounced. Likewise family controlled banks have taken on 
additional credit risk by lending funds to friends and associates and 












The allocation of pOints within this sub-set will be determined as 
follows: 
• 100 points if the largest shareholder holds less than ten 
percent of the shares. 
• 75 pOints if the percentage ownership of the largest 
shareholder is within the range of ten percent and 25 percent. 
• 50 points if the percentage ownership of the largest 
shareholder is within the range of 26 percent and 50 percent. 
• 25 points if the percentage ownership of the largest 
shareholder is within the range of 51 percent and 75 percent. 
• 0 points if the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder 
is 76 percent or greater. 
The use of the allocation of points in a range as above is 
considered to be the best use to extract the maximum amount of 
information from the inputs. The absolute percentage of shares 
owned by either government or a family unit has an inverse 
relationship with the allocated points in that the objective is to 
penalise the bank that has a high percentage of government or 
family involvement and likewise favour a bank that has a low 
percentage. 
ii. Number of non-executive directors versus the number of executive 
directors 
It is crucial that the number of non-executive directors on the board 
of directors is greater than the number of executive directors. This 
is to ensure the independence of the board and their resultant 
decisions. The larger the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board the better the corporate governance and the resulting 
decisions should be based on sound economic and financial 
considerations. However the issue in frontier markets will be 
quantum of individuals who qualify and have the required skills set 












individuals are on a number of boards which could lead to their 
independence being called into question. 
The allocation of points within this sub-set will be determined as the 
actual percentage that non-executive directors comprise of the 
board of directors. The use of the discrete value is that a positive 
relationship exists between this sub-set and the points allocated. 
Banks that have the highest percentage of non-executive directors 
should score the highest scores and those with the lowest 
percentage of non-executive directors will score lower and thus be 
penalised. 
iii. Structure of audit committees? 
The oversight of the audit committee has played an increasingly 
important role in ensuring that the company complies with the 
corporate governance requirements in all respects. The audit 
committee should also be chaired by a non-executive director to 
ensure that the oversight process and decisions taken are within the 
most sound mandate given to the said committee. 
The allocation of points within this sub-set will be determined as the 
actual percentage of the audit committee members that are non-
executive multiplied by two if the chairman is also a non-executive 
director or by one if the chairman is an executive director. The use 
of the discrete value is that a positive relationship exists between 
this sub-set and the pOints allocated. Banks that have the highest 
percentage should score the highest scores and those with the 
lowest percentage will score lower and thus be penalised. 
iv. Related party transactions 
Related party transactions should be concluded on an arms length 
basis and on normal commercial terms that would apply to 
independent parties. Within the frontier markets there is likely to be 












personal wealth in these countries is concentrated amongst a few 
families and a couple of individuals. Thus the weighting of related 
party transactions is made by relating the amount of related party 
transactions to the capital amount of the bank. The lower the 
percentage of related party loans to capital the lower the risk, as the 
bank has greater capital resources in order to absorb any potential 
losses from these related party loans. 
The allocation of points within this sub-set will be determined as 
follows: 
• 100 Points if total related party loans are less than ten percent 
of the bank's capital. 
• 75 Points if total related party loans is within the range of ten 
percent and 20 percent of the bank's capital. 
• 50 Points if total related party loans is within the range of 21 
percent and 30 percent of the bank's capital. 
• 25 Points if total related party loans is within the range of 31 
percent and 40 percent of the bank's capital. 
• 0 Points if total related party loans are greater than 40 percent 
of the bank's capital or no detailed disclosure of related party 
transactions is provided in the annual financial statements. 
The use of the allocation of points in a range as above is 
considered to be the best use to extract the maximum amount of 
information from the inputs. The absolute percentage of the related 
party loans to capital has an inverse relationship with the allocated 
points in that the objective is to penalise the bank that has a high 
percentage of related party loans and likewise favour a bank that 
has a low percentage. 
The corporate governance category will attract a category weight of 40 
percent and an overall weight of 16 percent (40 percent category weight 












each have an equal weighting of 25 percent and an overall weighting of four 
percent (16 percent multiplied by 25 percent). 
3.2.1.2 Market share 
Market share is an important component of overall brand value and thus 
market share is an important qualitative measure as to the strength of the 
particular bank's franchise. The strength of the bank's market share enables it 
to retain and attract clients through tough times. This retention and attraction 
of clients will be at the detriment of other banking operations that do not have 
such strong market shares and where confidence is lacking in the weaker 
franchise. 
A vital consideration is if the required information will be available from the 
frontier markets and how reliable this information would be. Ideally the 
information required under the sub-sets would b  provided by the Central 
Banks and as such one should take some comfort from the numbers that they 
present. 
Market share is split into two further sub-sets: 
i. Market share as measured by the individual bank's total assets as a 
percentage of total banking assets in the industry. 
ii. Market share as measured by the individual bank's total deposits as 
a percentage of total banking deposits in the industry. 
The market share would relate to the overall market share of the 
bank to the whole banking industry. This information would be 
gathered from the banking reports that are required to be submitted 
to the Central Bank. 
The allocation of pOints within the first sub-set will be determined as 
the actual percentage of the respective bank's total assets relative 
to the value of total assets of the banking industry as released in the 












set will be the actual percentage of the respective bank's total 
deposits relative to the value of the total deposits of the banking 
industry within that country. The use of the discrete value is that a 
positive relationship exists between the above sub-sets and the 
pOints allocated. Banks that have the highest market shares should 
score the highest scores and those with the lowest market shares 
will score lower and thus be penalised. 
The market share category will attract a category weight of 40 percent and an 
overall weight of 16 percent (40 percent category weight multiplied by 40 
percent for qualitative factors). The two sub-sectors will have equal 
weightings of 50 percent and each sub sector's overall weighting will be eight 
percent (50 percent multiplied by 16 percent). 
3.2.1.3 Financial reporting 
It is probably unexpected that financial reporting is considered to be a 
qualitative factor as the quantitative factors deal with various financial issues. 
However the importance of the reporting of the financial information needs to 
be critically assessed in order to be able to place reliance on the correctness 
and consistency of the numbers hat are presented to stakeholders. 
The issue to be considered under the qualitative assessment is the timeliness 
of financial information. 
i. Financial information timeliness 
Not only are the financial reporting standards vitally important to an 
analyst, but also the provision of the financial statements within a 
timely period. The timely proviSion of financial information ensures that 
the information is still relevant and pertinent to enable a complete 
value added assessment to be performed. 













• 100 Points if the bank publishes its signed audited financial 
statements within three months of the respective financial year 
end. 
• 75 Points if the bank publishes its signed audited financial 
statements within four months (but not within three months) of the 
respective financial year end. 
• 50 Points if the bank publishes its signed audited financial 
statements within five months (but not within four months) of the 
respective financial year end. 
• 25 Points if the bank publishes its signed audited financial 
statements within six months (but not within five months) of the 
respective financial year end. 
• No points if the bank publishes its signed audited financial 
statements more than six months after the respective financial 
year end. 
The use of the allocation of points in a range as above is 
considered to be the best process to extract the maximum amount 
of information from the inputs. The absolute number of months to 
provide financial information has an inverse relationship with the 
allocated pOints in that the objective is to penalise a bank that takes 
longer to provide its financial information and likewise favour a bank 
that provides its financial information in a relatively quick timeframe. 
The financial reporting category will attract a category weight of ten percent 
and an overall weight of four percent (ten percent category weight multiplied 
by 40 percent for the qualitative factors). 
This sub-sector will have a weight of 100 percent and thus the sub sector's 
overall weighting will be four percent (100 percent multiplied by four percent). 
3.2.1.4 Regulatory environment 
The regulatory environment that exists in frontier markets places unique 
stresses on banks that operate in these markets. The past level of political 












were made on non-economic terms and thus the level of non-performing loans 
has been historically high. In addition, the challenge that exists in frontier 
markets is the manner and impact of Central Bank regulation. In the past the 
level of skills within the Central Banks of frontier markets was limited and as 
such the due and proper regulation of banking entities was poor. In addition, 
the inability of the Central Banks to enforce compliance and impose penalties 
for non-compliance historically led to them to be viewed as a "toothless 
watchdog". 
The regulatory environment category is based on the implied support that is 
anticipated to be received from the Central Bank in times of financial difficulty. 
i. Support from the Central Bank 
This is a highly subjective sub-set and would be gauged 
predominantly from interaction with the Central Bank and also the 
importance of the bank within the country's banking system. In the 
individual bank questionnaire this question would also be posed to 
the bank. 
The allocation of paints within this sub-set will be determined as the 
actual percentage of support from the respective Central Bank that 
is likely to be forthcoming and also taking into account the ability of 
the said Central Bank to provide such support. The use of the 
discrete value is that a positive relationship exists between this sub-
set and the points allocated. Banks that have the highest likelihood 
of central bank support should score the highest scores and those 
with the lowest likelihood of Central Bank support will score lower 
and thus be penalised. 
The regulatory environment category will attract a category weight of ten 
percent and an overall weight of four percent (ten percent category weight 
multiplied by 40 percent for the qualitative factors). The sub-sector will have a 
weight of 100 percent and thus the sub-sector's overall weighting will be four 












3.2.2 Quantitative Factors 
The quantitative factors will be given a weighting of 60 percent and would be 
divided into five broad categories. The five broad categories would then be 
specific focus areas and will be analysed in detail in order to obtain the 
relative value to be used in the overall credit assessment. 
The methodology would ideally have information for a rolling five year period 
and thus an average financial score would be taken over this period. 
However initially a three year period would suffice and then work towards an 
ongoing five year rolling average period. 
The five broad categories are as follows: 
(a) Profitability 
(b) Liquidity 
(c) Capital adequacy 
(d) Efficiency 
(e) Asset quality 
Within the broad categories there will be a number of further sub-sets that will 
be analysed. A detailed discussion of the categories and sub-sets follows 
hereunder. 
3.2.2.1 Profitability 
Bank profitability is crucial for the bank's financial strength as with the profits 
generated it is able to finance Its ongoing operations and build equity through 
the retained income line item. 
Profitability has been further split into two further sub-sets: 
i. Operating profit prior to impairments as a percentage of total assets 
This ratio is used to gauge how the bank's operating profit without the 
impairment charge relates to the total asset base. The ratio is relevant 
to monitor the trend in how the profits are generated with a changing 












prior to impairments as a percentage of assets will score higher in this 
particular sub-set. 
ii. Net income before tax as a percentage total income 
The net income before tax margin is also an important ratio to be 
monitored for its trends and provides invaluable data as to the 
sustainable health of the bank. The higher the bank's net income 
before tax margin is relative to its peers, the higher the points scored 
for this sub-set. 
The allocation of points within the sub-sets will be determined as the 
actual percentages recorded for each sub-set from the financial 
statements obtained for analysis. Discrete values are used as a 
positive relationship exists between the sub-sets and the points 
allocated. Banks that have the highest operating profit prior to 
impairments as a percentage of total assets and net income before tax 
margins will score the highest scores and those with the lowest 
percentages will score lower and thus be penalised. 
The profitability category will attract a category weight of 15 percent and an 
overall weight of nine percent (15 percent category weight multiplied by 60 
percent for quantitative factors). The two sub-sectors will have an equal 
weighting of 50 percent and each sub-sector's overall weighting will be four 
and a half percent (50 percent multiplied by the nine percent). 
3.2.2.2 Liquidity 
The ability of the bank to be able to meet its liabilities from its assets is crucial 
for the future sustainability of the bank, especially in times of turbulence and 
market disruptions. The question is whether in uncertain times the bank will 
have the resources to be able to withstand such troubled times. The ratio to 
be considered here is total depoSits as a percentage of total loans. The 
higher this ratio the better the bank would be able to withstand any troubled 












The allocation of points within this sub-set will be determined as the actual 
percentage of total deposits to total loans obtained from the financial 
statements. Discrete values are used as a positive relationship exists 
between this sub-set and the points allocated. Banks that have the highest 
percentage of total deposits to total loans will score the highest scores and 
those with the lowest percentages will score lower and thus be penalised. 
The liquidity category will attract a category weight of 22.5 percent and an 
overall weight of 13.5 percent (22.5 percent category weight multiplied by 60 
percent for quantitative factors). 
The sole sub-sector will have a weight of 100 percent and the sub-sector's 
overall weighting will be 13.5 percent (100 percent multiplied by the 13.5 
percent). 
3.2.2.3 Capital Adequacy 
Capital is the buffer that the bank has to use in troubled times in order to 
. absorb losses and to continue to operate. This issue has come under 
increasing scrutiny given the turbulent times experienced since August 2007 
when the sub prime debacle first emerged. The issue of sufficient capital is 
most relevant in frontier markets given that the asset quality has in the past 
not been of global standards. Thus with poorer asset quality and profitability 
the rational expectation is that the capital adequacy ratios in these frontier 
markets would be higher than in the more developed world. The higher 
capital adequacy ratios would provide additional comfort to investors who 
would see this large buffer as a mitigant of the higher risk asset portfolio. 
Capital adequacy has been further split into two further sub-sets: 
i. Tier 1 ratio 
ii. Shareholders equity as a percentage of total assets 
The tier 1 ratio is defined as the share capital and share premium plus 












A combination of the tier 1 ratio as defined in the Basel II accord and then also 
a simplistic ratio of shareholders equity to total assets is utilised in this 
category. Shareholders equity is defined as share capital and share premium 
plus retained income and distributable and non-distributable reserves. The 
reason for the combination is that it is a more accurate reflection of the true 
capital structure and adequacy of a bank. Today the issue of capital has been 
polluted by hybrid instruments of tier 1 and tier 2 origins that cloud the true 
protection position of real capital. Thus the higher the above two ratios are 
the better the bank will fare relative to its peers. 
The allocation of points within the sub-sets will be determined as the actual 
percentages recorded for each sub-set from the financial statements obtained 
for analysis. Discrete values are used as a positive relationship exists 
between the sub-sets and the points allocated. Banks that have the highest 
capital adequacy will score the highest scores and those with the lowest 
capital adequacy will score lower and thus be penalised. 
The capital adequacy category will attract a category weight of 22.5 percent 
and an overall weight of 13.5 percent (22.5 percent category weight multiplied 
by 60 percent for quantitative factors). The two sub-sectors will have equal 
weightings of 50 percent and each sub-sector's overall weighting will be six 
and three quarters percent (50 percent multiplied by the 13.5 percent). 
3.2.2.4 Efficiency 
Efficiency will be measured by using the cost to income ratio that is well 
known and widely calculated by banks globally. The ratio is important as 
banks that are more cost efficient are more able to respond to changing 
circumstances much faster and if the cost structure is lean then they will able 
to weather troubled times that much more nimbly. In addition more cost 
efficient banks tend to have better asset quality as evidenced from past 
research. 
The allocation of points within this sub-set will be determined as the actual 












income ratio will have a negative added to it so as to penalize those banks 
that have a higher cost to income ratio. Thus their overall score will be 
decreased by their respective cost to income ratio. 
The efficiency category will attract a category weight of ten percent and an 
overall weight of six percent (ten percent category weight multiplied by 60 
percent for quantitative factors). The sub-sector will have a weight of 100 
percent and the sub sector's overall weighting will be six percent (100 percent 
multiplied by the six percent). 
3.2.2.5 Asset Quality 
Asset quality plays an important role in the assessment of ba ks globally as 
the incurrence of substantial bad loans can place a bank in a precarious 
financial position. This has been well documented of late with reference to the 
sub prime crisis which has seen large international banks taking substantial 
write downs and having to raise additional capital at punitive rates. It is not 
unlikely that we will see that the business models of these large international 
banks will be changed by this grave crisis that has hit the global credit 
markets. 
Asset quality is split into two further SUb-sets: 
i. Non-performing loans as a percentage of gross loans 
This is a commonly calculated ratio by banks globally and attempts 
to indicate how the quality of the gross loan book looks. The 
absolute percentage is important but also the trend that is reflected 
by this percentage over time. 
This sub-set will also have a negative imposed on the percentage 
as those banks that have a high level of non-performing loans will 













ii. The percentage change in loan growth 
In frontier markets the above ratio is considered to be important in 
that banks might be willing just to chase increased market share 
through the rapid advancement of new loans, whether the loan 
quality is bad or good. Thus where loan growth is exceptionally 
high this could result in current non-performing loans being 
reflected at much lower levels than they actually are. 
Thus the above ratio is a conservative ratio and attempts to smooth 
out the impact of rapid loan growth from the outset. This ratio will 
also have a negative assigned to it in order to establish an accurate 
reflection of the asset quality of frontier banks. 
The allocation of points within the sub-sets will be determined as the actual 
percentages for each sub-set as obtained from the financial statements. The 
sub-sets will have a negative added to it so as to penalize those banks that 
have higher levels of non-performing loans and also higher loan growth. Thus 
their overall score will be decreased by their respective asset quality scores. 
The asset quality category will attract a category weight of 30 percent and an 
overall weight of 18 percent (30 percent category weight multiplied by 60 
percent for the quantitative factors). The non-performing loans as a 
percentage of gross loans sub-sector will have a sub-sector weighting of 70 
percent and thus an overall weighting of 12.6 percent (70 percent multiplied 
by the 18 percent). The percentage change in loan growth will have a sub-
sector weighting of 30 percent and thus an overall weighting of five and two 
fifths percent (30 percent multiplied by the 18 percent). The latter has a 
different sub-sector weight as it is not deemed as important as the actual 
non-performing loan percentage but it is also a crucial forecasting tool in 
order to potentially estimate any growth in future non-performing loans due to 












Chapter 4 Methodology Results 
4.1 Bank Questi onnaire 
The response from the banks in Kenya and Nigeria was hugely disappointing 
as only one bank out of the 11 bank completed and returned the questionnaire, 
namely NIC Bank from Kenya. 
However some insight was gained from this lone response and was useful to 
a most limited degree. From the response it would appear that banking 
remains a simple operation of taking deposits and then granting loans in the 
frontier markets. Thus NIC Bank responded that the issues of credit 
derivatives, securitisation structures and conduits are not a feature of the 
Kenyan banking industry. Bancassurance has only recently started in Kenya 
and most Kenyan banks have links with an insurance company with whom 
they are working closely to derive mutual bottom line benefits. 
From reading the Fitch rating reports on various Nigerian banks it would 
appear that the banking industry in this country is also not specialised and the 
products of credit derivatives, securitisation and conduit structures have not 
penetrated that market, either. 
This poor response is a severe indictment on the banks and how they view 
and consider potential offshore investment in their respective businesses and 
also the country in general. This aversion to answer a simple questionnaire 
would call into question as to how they would consider diversifying their 
funding and also their approach to corporate governance. The latter would 
have particular reference to the manner in which the banks engage with 
potential investors and also the openness with which they deal with investors. 
When the frontier banks ignore potential interest in their markets by a large 
South African investor it provides evidence that the said banks are behind the 












The proposed methodology had as its first point of assessment and interaction 
the completion of the bank questionnaire. However in view of the extremely 
poor response the bank questionnaire will no longer play a part in the 
methodology. Thus the methodology and assessment that follows is based 
solely on the qualitative and quantitative information that could be derived 
from the individual banks annual reports and then also information gleaned 
from the Central Bank annual reports. 
4.2 Methodology Process 
The relevant qualitative and quantitative information has been populated into 
the respective spreadsheets and the sections that follow will provide the 
outcomes of the information input into the model. 
Firstly the assessment of the Kenyan banks will be discussed and then a 
comparison will be made with a South African tier 2 bank, namely Capitec 
Bank Limited ("Capitec"). Capitec was chosen as it has a similar target 
market to the frontier banks and operates in a similar manner. Thereafter the 
assessment of the Nigerian banks will be discussed and a comparison made 
with Capitec. To conclude this chapter a summary of all the banks relative 
scores will be provided and then a spread comparison will also be discussed 
in order to derive relative value. 
4.3 Kenyan Bank Assessment 
The banks included in the methodology for Kenya are as follows: 
(a) Commercial Bank of Africa ("CBA") 
(b) Diamond Trust Bank 
(c) Equity Bank 
(d) K-Rep Bank 
(e) NIC Bank 












An analysis of the component parts of the methodology will follow and then 
conclude with the bank's relative scores that will enable the bank's to be 
ranked in descending order. 
The methodology calls for the financial information to be collected over a 
rolling five year period. For the Kenyan assessment the financial information 
available allowed a rolling three period to be used. Thus over the next few 
years the model will be populated with five years of data as the financial data 
is released and input into the model. 
4.3.1 Qualitative Factors 
4.3.1.1 Corporate Governance 
Frontier Country Bank As .... m.nt • K.nya 
Ownership 
Corporat. Governanc. Non-Executive> Executive 
Audit Committees 
Related Party Transactions 











Bank Bank Bank 
2.67 3.00 3.00 1.00 
3.56 3.68 3.20 2.52 
8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
3.67 4.00 3.33 . 
• CBA did not score any points for ownership as the bank is privately 
owned and a leading Kenyan family (Kenyatta) has a majority 
ownership. 
• Diamond Trust Bank scored 2.00 pOints for ownership as the Aga 
Khan Fund for Economic Development has maintained a 17.32 
percent direct ownership of the bank and then also has an indirect 
ownership of 18.49 percent through the Habib Bank Limited and The 
Jubilee Insurance Company Limited. 
• Equity Bank scored 2.67 pOints as in 2006 the bank listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange and thus its spread of shareholders 
increased rapidly over time. 
• K-Rep Bank and NIC Bank both scored 3.00 points as their largest 
shareholder was consistently below 25 percent for the three year 
period under review. 
• Stanbic Bank scored 1.00 points as the bank is majority owned by 













ii. Number of non-executive directors is greater than the number of 
executive directors 
• CBA scored 2.67 points as 67 percent of their board has been 
made up of non-executive directors consistently over the three year 
period under review. 
• Diamond Trust Bank scored 2.80 points as 70 percent of their board 
has been made up of non-executive directors consistently over the 
three year period under review. 
• Equity Bank scored 3.56 points as 89 percent of their board has 
been made up of non-executive directors consistently over the three 
year period under review. 
• K-Rep Bank scored 3.68 points as 92 percent of their board has 
been made up of non-executive directors consistently over the three 
year period under review. 
• NIC Bank scored 3.20 points as 80 percent of their board has been 
made up of non-executive directors consistently over the three year 
period under review. 
• Stanbic Bank scored 2.52 points as 63 percent of their board has 
been made up of non-executive directors consistently over the three 
year period under review. 
iii. Are audit committees in place? 
• All the banks scored 8.00 points as the audit committees consist 
solely of non-executive directors and the chairmen are all non-
executive directors. 
The banks in Kenya all had audit committees where the voting 
members are non-executive directors. The chairman of the said 
committee was also a non-executive director in all instances. 
iv. The scope of related party transactions 
• CBA scored 3.33 points as they scored 75 points in 2005 when total 
related party loans was between 11 percent and 20 percent of 












they scored 100 points hm'/ever in 2007 this once <lg,-,in moved out 
to between 11 and 20 percent and thus they scored 75 points 
• Diamond Trust Bank scored 4.00 points as the bank scored the 
maximum of 100 points consistently over the three ye<lr period as 
related party loans remained below ten percent throUl-1hout 
• Equity Bank scored 3,67 points as they scored 75 points in 2005 
when total related party loans was between 11 percent <lnd 20 
percent of capital. In 2006 and 2007 they scored 100 points as the 
percentage of total related party loans was below ten percent of 
c<lpit.; 1 
• K-Rep B,-,nk scored 4,00 points <lS the b<lnk scored the maximum of 
100 points consistently over the three year period as rel<lted P<lrty 
loans remained below ten percent througlloul. 
• NIC Semk scored 333 points as in 2005 and 2006 they scored 75 
points ,-,s the tot,-,I rel<lted p,-,rty lo,-,ns wer  between ten percent and 
20 percent of capital. In 2007 this percent<lge improved to below 
ten percent of capital and thus they scored 100 points 
• Stanbic Bank did not score any points ,-,s they do not provide <lny 










K-Rep B<lnk scores the highest over,-,II corpor<lte govern,-,nce score 
followed closely by Equity Bank. NIC Sank and Diamond Trust Bank 












criteria and Stanbic Bank had the worst overall corporate governance 
score. 
4.3.1.2 Market share 
CBA 
Diamond Equity K.Rep 
NICBank 
Stanblc 
Frontier Country Bank Asse.sment • Kenya Trust Bank Bank Bank 
SC0f8 Score Score Score Score Score 
Markst Share IPer Total Assets 
0.42 0.28 0.31 0.06 0.30 0.28 
IPer Total Deposits 0.54 0.33 0.31 0.05 0.36 0.36 
i. Market share based on percentage of total assets 
• CBA had a consistent five percent of the banking industry's assets 
for the three year period. 
• Diamond Trust Bank had a market share of three percent of total 
banking assets in 2005 and 2006. They increased this percentage 
to five percent in 2007. 
• Equity Bank only had a two percent market share of total assets in 
2005, and increased this to three percent in 2006. In 2007 they 
managed to capture seven percent of the banking industry's total 
assets. 
• K-Rep Bank is the smallest bank amongst its peers listed above with 
a consistent market share of only one percent of total assets. 
• NIC Bank had a three percent market share of total assets in 2005 
and increased this to four percent in both 2006 and 2007. 
• Stanbic Bank had a three percent market share of total assets in 
2005 and i creased this to four percent in 2006 and 2007. 
ii. Market share based on percentage of total deposits 
• CBA had a seven percent market share of the banking industry's 
total deposits for 2005 and 2006. In 2007 this decreased slightly to 
six percent. 
• Diamond Trust Bank had a market share of four percent of total 
banking deposits in 2005 and 2006. They increased this percentage 
to five percent in 2007. 
• Equity Bank only had a two percent market share by total deposits in 












managed to capture six percent of the banking industry's tota l 
deposits. 
• K-Rep Bank maintained a market share of deposits of one percent 
consistently over the three year period. 
• NIC Bank had a market sIlare of four percent of total deposits in 
2005 and increased this to five percent in 2006. However in 2007 
this reduced again to the four percent level. 
• Stanbic Bank increased their market share of total deposits from 
three percent in 2005 to five percent in 2006 and 2007 . 
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CBA scores the highest overal l market share score, followed closely by 
NIC Bank and Stanbic Bank_ Equity Bank and Diamond Trust Bank are 
fourth and fifth best. whilst K-Rep Bank has the worst overall market 
share score. 
4.3.1.3 Financial Reporting 
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• Al l the banks scored four points here as they are regulated to produce 
their results on a quarterly basis and their annual report has to be 
published within three months of the December year end in terms of 
- 70 -. 











statute. All the banks complied with statue and published their results 
within the three month period. 
4.3.1.4 Regulatory Environment 
CBA 
Diamond Equity K-Rep 
HICBank 
Stanblc 
Frontier Country Bank Assessment - Kenya Trust Bank Bank Bank 
SCore SCOre SCOre SCOre SCOre SCOre 
Regulatory Environment ISUPport from Central Bank 1.00 1.33 1.33 2.00 1.00 
This aspect is highly subjective and was considered after taking into 
account the role that the respective bank plays in the economy and from 
interactions that were held with the respective banks and the central bank. 
• CBA was anticipated to only have a chance of receiving support from 
the Central Bank of 25 percent. The reasoning is that the bank is a 
private bank and these private shareholders would be expected to 
support the bank through difficult times. 
• Diamond Trust Bank was also anticipated to have a relatively small 
chance of Central Bank support (25 percent) in 2005 and 2006 as the 
bank had a strong majority shareholder. However the bank increased 
its market share through to 2007 and with their focus on the retail 
sector and specifically the small and medium enterprises that play a 
major role in the business the possibility of Central Bank support has 
most likely increased to 50 percent. The bank is also listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange ("NSE") and thus the direct impact of a failure 
will be felt through the economy. 
• Equity Bank is anticipated to have a relatively small chance of Central 
Bank support (25 percent) in 2005 and 2006. Equity Bank has shown 
sound growth and increases in market share and thus in 2007 this level 
of anticipated support from the central bank increased to 50 percent. 
As with the Diamond Trust Bank above, the bank's main focus in on the 
retail market and this plays a major role in the Kenyan economy. 
• K-Rep Bank is the smallest bank but it is has an upliftment focus of the 
people of Kenya. This falls well within the aspirations of the central 
bank and government itself. Therefore K-Rep Bank would in all 













the goals of upliftment are achieved and the bank is also small enough 
for the Central Bank to be able to assist it in a meaningful way 
• NIC Bank is classified the same as CBA largely due to their focus on 
the corporate market The bank is also listed on the NSE_ It is 
anticipated that the bank could only expect to receive support from the 
central bank of 25 percent consistently over the three year period 
• Stanbic Bank would not receive any Central Bank support as its parent 
is the South African bank, Standard Bank. Therefore the CBK would 
not provide any support and Stanbic Bank would re ly on support from 
its South African parent. Standard Bank is a large South African 
banking group and would be expected to provide any support if the 
bank encountered any difficult times 
4.3.1.5 Overall Qualitative Scores 
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• K-Rep Bank scored the highest in terms of the qualitative factors given 
that it scored the highest in the corporate governance sector and also 
has a greater chance of Central Bank support 
• Equity Bank was the second strongest bank based on the qualitative 
factors and was tied with NIC Bank with the second highest scores for 













• Diamond Trust Bank was fourth followed by CBA and Stanbic Bank 
respectively. Stanbic Bank was adversely affected in the corporate 
governance sector where it scored lowly in the ownership sub-set and 
no points in the related party sub-set. 
4.3.2 Quantitative Factors 
4.3.2.1 Profitability 
CBA 
DllII10fId Equity K·Rap 
NlC Bank 
Stanblc 
Frontier Country Bank As .... m.nt - Kenya Trust Bank Bank Bank 
l5COre l5COre l5COre l5COre scar. l5COre 
Profltllbliity 10peraling Profit IJI'iOI' to Impalrmentsitotal asaets 0.12 0.14 0.24 U.13 0.15 
INet Incom. before tax/toIaI Incom. 1.82 1.93 1.52 0.71 1.59 
i. Operating profit prior to impairments divided by total assets 
• CBA has shown a consistent improvement in the ratio of operating 
profit prior to impairments to total assets from two percent in 2005 to 
four percent in 2007. 
• Diamond Trust Bank reflected the identical ratio of three percent 
throughout the three year period. 
• Equity Bank's ratios were a mixed bag with the ratio at five percent 
in 2005 and then increasing to six percent in 2006 but then falling 
back to four percent in 2007. 
• K-Rep Bank reflected an increasing trend of the ratio from two 
percent in 2005 to four percent in 2007. 
• NIC Bank had a stable ratio of three percent in 2005 and 2006 and 
this increased to four percent in 2007. 
• Stanbic Bank had a ratio of three percent in 2005 and then this 
increased to four percent in 2006 and remained constant at this level 
in 2007. 
ii. Net income before tax margin 
• CBA's net income margin has been volatile and in 2005 the ratio 
was a low of 20 percent. This then increased to a sound 54 percent 
in 2006 before declining to 47 percent in 2007. 
• Diamond Trust Bank recorded a net income margin of 37 percent in 
2005 and subsequently increased this to 47 percent in 2006. In 


















Equity Bank has shown an increasing trend in their net income 
margin starling "'ith a low of 28 percent in 2005, increasing to 33 
percent in 2006 and 41 percent in 2007. 
K-Rep BClnk has the Im'Jest net income margins amongst its peers 
and reflected a ratio of only 11 percent in 2005. They managed to 
increase this 10 19 percent in 2006 and then a slight decline 
occurred to take the ratio back to 17 percent. 
NIC Bank has iJe8n successfully in increasing its net income margin 
substantially over the period. In 2005 the ratio ,,'as only 28 percent 
which then increased to 34 percent and 44 percent in 2006 and 
2007 respectively 
Stanbic Bank has managed to increase its net income margin over 
the period too. The rabo ,,'as 32 percent in 2005 and then increased 







On an overall IJasis for profitability, Diaillond Trusl Bank ,,'as the top 
ranked bank. followed by St:;nbic B:;nk :;nd CBA 
The fourth ranked bank was Equity Bank and then NIC Bank was 
ranked in fiflh place. K-Rep B:;nk I'I:;S the I:;st r:;nked tJ:;nk and this 














Diamond Equity K.Rep 
NICBank 
Stanblc 
Frontier Country Bank Auaament • Kenya Trust Bank Bank Bank 
SCOre score 5Core 5Core score 5Core 
Liquidity lTotal Deposits I Total Liabilities 18.8· 15.10 5.9 10.29 14.3u_ 10.23 
• CBA's ratio of total deposits to total loans reflects a declining trend from 
1.50 cover in 2005 to 1.40 times in 2006 and then to 1.29 times cover 
in 2007. This is a result of the faster growth in total loans versus the 
growth in total deposits. 
• Diamond Trust Bank ratio of total deposits to total loans has remained 
relatively constant over the period, with ratios of 1.13 times cover in 
2005, 1.1 cover in 2006 and 1.12 times cover in 2007. 
• Equity Bank's ratios ha~e been quite volatile with the ratio being 1.19 
times cover in 2005 and then increasing to 1.26 times cover in 2006. 
The ratio then declined rapidly to 1.1 times cover in 2007. 
This is a result of the rapid growth in both loans and deposits however 
in 2007 the growth in loans was 220 percent while deposits increased 
by 192 percent. 
• K-Rep Bank is the only bank amongst its peers that has substantially 
more loans than deposits. Consequently their ratios are thus only 0.67 
times cover in 2005 and 0.87 times cover in both 2006 and 2007. 
• NIC Bank's ratio of total deposits to total loans was 1.09 times cover in 
2005 and 2006. This ratio fell to 1 times cover in 2007 as total loans 
marginally exceeded the level of total deposits. 
• Stanbic Bank's ratio has remained relatively stable at 1.11 times cover 
in both 2005 and 2006. In 2007 this ratio increased to 1.17 times cover 
as total deposits increased by 33 percent and total loans only 
increased by 26 percent. 
The ranking for liquidity was then as follows - first is CBA, second is 
Equity Bank, third is Stanbic Bank, fourth is Diamond Trust Bank, fifth is 












4.3.2.3 Capital Adequacy 
Frontier Country Bank AM.ament - Kenya CBA 
Diamond Equity K-Rep 
HIC Bank 
Stanblc 
Trust Bank Bank Bank 
Capital Adequacy lTier 1 Rallo ('II.) 
0.91 1.05 1.35 0.86 0.66 
IShareholders EquitylTotal As 0.65 0.87 1.19 1.19 0.91 
i. Tier 1 ratio 
The Central Bank of Kenya minimum requirement for the tier 1 ratio is 
eight percent. 
• CBA's tier 1 ratio has been consistently above the required 
regulatory minimum. In 2005 the ratio was a 12.20 percent and 
14.84 percent and 13.47 percent in 2006 and 2007 respectively. 
1.03 
0.76 
• Diamond Trust Bank has consistently increased its tier 1 ratio from 
a low of 11.1 percent in 2005. They increased this to 16.5 percent 
in 2006 and then to a high level of 19.1 percent. This amount of 
capital provides a sound buffer to investors. 
• Equity Bank did not disclose a tier 1 ratio in their 2005 annual report. 
The disclosure also did not include any report on risk weighted 
assets and thus the manual calculation of the ratio was not possible. 
The 2006 annual report reflected a tier 1 ratio of 14 percent and this 
was then substantially increased to 46% in 2007. This is an 
extremely high ratio and it is expected to decrease in the years 
ahead as the bank raised additional capital to ensure that their 
expansion program would be well funded. In the model an average 
of two years where the ratio is disclosed will be used. The 2006 and 
2007 ratios will still be averaged over the three year period so as to 
penalise Equity Bank for not disclosing this valuable financial 
variable. 
• K-Rep Bank also did not disclose a tier 1 ratio for 2005 and the 
manual calculation of the ratio was not possible due to a lack of 
information. K-Rep Bank's tier 1 ratio in 2006 was a sound 20.53 
percent but then decreased to 17.5 percent in 2007. The 2006 and 
2007 ratios will still be averaged over the three year period so as to 













• NIC Bank did not disclose a tier 1 ratio for 2005 but reflected an 
improving trend in the ratio from 13.3 percent in 2006 to 15.84 
percent in 2007. The 2006 and 2007 ratios will still be averaged 
over the three year period so as to penalise NIC Bank for not 
disclosing this valuable financial variable. 
• Stanbic Bank reflected a tier 1 ratio of 15.62 percent in 2005, which 
they increased to 16.69 percent in 2006. The ratio then showed a 
decline to 13.28 percent in 2007. 
ii. Shareholders equity divided by total assets 
• CBA has shown an increasing trend in the ratio of shareholders 
equity to total assets over the three year period. The ratio in 2005 
was eight percent and increased to ten percent in 2006. The 2007 
ratio was 11 percent. 
• Diamond Trust Bank also reflected an increasing trend in their ratio. 
The ratios were ten percent in 2005, 13 percent in 2006 and 15 
percent in 2007. 
• Equity Bank recorded a shareholder equity to total assets ratio of 14 
percent in 2005 and this then declined to 11 percent in 2006. 
However this increased substantially in 2007 to a strong ratio of 28 
percent. 
• K-Rep Bank has shown a decreasing trend in their ratio of 
shareholders equity to total assets. The ratio in 2005 was a sound 
21 percent and then in 2006 this decreased to 17 percent. The 
2007 ratio was a low of 14 percent. 
• NIC Bank has a ratio of shareholders equity to total assets of 13 
percent in 2005. This ratio declined to 12 percent in 2006 and then 
increased to 15 percent at the end of 2007. 
• Stanbic Bank's ratio of shareholders equity to total assets reflected a 
declining trend from 14 percent in 2005 to 11 percent and ten 
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Overall the ranking for capital adequacy was headed by perhaps the two 
most risky banks amongst this peer group, namely Equity Bank and K-Rep 
Bank. Equity Bank is a rapidly growing institution and thus requires 
substantial capital to fund this growth. K-Rep Bank is more of a 
development bank that takes higher risks on the poorer communities for 
upliftment and thus they are required to hold additional capital to 
compensate for the increased risks taken. 
4.3.2.4 Efficiency 
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• CBA has been successful in reducing its cost to income ra tio in each 
year of the period under review. In 2005 the ratio was 65 percent and 
this reduced to 54 percent in 2006. The ratio further declined to 52 
percent in 2007 
• Diamond Trust Bank decreased its cost to income ratio from 59 percent 
in 2005 to 51 percent in 2006. This ratio has then stabilised at this 
level for the year ended 2007. 
• Equity Bank has been successful to decrease their cost to income ratio 
on a consistent basis despite their large expansion program The ratio 
was recorded as 65 percent in 2005, decreasing to 63 percent and 59 












• K-Rep Bank's cost to income ratio is the highest amongst its selected 
peer group but they have managed to reduce the ratio each 
subsequent year. In 2005 it was at a high level of 87 percent, declining 
to 78 percent in 2006 and then ultimately to 77 percent in 2007. This 
ratio still remains stubbornly high. 
• NIC Bank has placed an emphasis to reduce its cost to income ratio 
from a high of 60 percent in 2005. The ratio declined modestly to 59 
percent in 2006 but then declined 52 percent in 2007. 
• Stanbic Bank has been most successful in decreasing their cost to 
income ratio from 66 percent in 2005 to 51 percent and 50 percent in 
2006 and 2007 respectively. 
Overall the ranking of the banks relative to the cost to income ratio 
indicated that Diamond Trust Bank was ranked number one, followed by 
Stanbic Bank, NIC Bank, CBA, Equity Bank and lastly K-Rep Bank. 
4.3.2.5 Asset Quality 
CBA 
Diamond Equity K-R.p 
NIC Bank Stanblc Frontl.r Country Bank As .... m.nt - K.nya Trust Bank Bank Bank 
Score SCore 5core 5core SCore SCore 
Asset Quality INPls/Gross Loans 
-0.75 -0.28 -0.77 -0.72 -0.43 -0.21 
1% Chang. in Loan Growth -2.96 -2.63 -4.97 -1.97 -1.33 -2.31 
i. Non-performing loans to gross loans 
• CBA's ratio NPLs to gross loans was reflected at a high of eight 
percent in 2005. It then reduced this to the level of five percent and 
held this level steady for 2007 as well. 
• Diamond Trust Bank reflected a NPL to gross loans ratio of three 
percent in 2005 and subsequently reduced this to a consistent level 
of two percent for both 2006 and 2007. 
• Equity Bank showed a high ratio of NPLs to gross loans in 2005 at 
nine percent. This has since been reduced to five percent in 2006 
and then four percent in 2007. However this reduction has 
predominantly being as a result of the rapid growth in loans and thus 
there is a chance that this ratio would increase into the future. 
• K-Rep Bank has shown a consistent four percent in both 2005 and 












• NIC Bank reflected four percent of NPLs to gross loans in both 2005 
and 2006. This reduced to a level of two percent in 2007. 
• Stanbic Bank reports low levels of bad debts as their ratio in 2005 
was only one percent, which then increased to two percent in 2006. 
The level in 2007 then reduced back down to one percent. 
ii. Percentage change in the growth of loans 
• CBA's percentage change in the growth of their loans was 
influenced greatly by the massive increase in 2005 of 117 percent. 
Thereafter the growth moderated to a level of 23 percent in 2006 
and 24 percent in 2007. 
• Diamond Trust Bank has experienced consistent strong growth in 
their loan book. In 2005 the loan book grew by 45 percent, followed 
by lower growth of 34 percent in 2006 and then increased again to 
68 percent in 2007. 
• Equity Bank has shown the most rapid growth in loans amongst its 
selected peer group. The growth has truly been phenomenal with 
growth rates of 78 percent, 98 percent and 100 percent in 2005, 
2006 and 2007 respectively. 
• K-Rep Bank reflected a subdued growth rate in loans in 2005 of 20 
percent. This then increased to 53 percent in 2006 and then 
declined to 36 percent in 2007. 
• NIC Bank has shown relatively moderate growth in their loan book 
when compared to its peers. NIC Bank's focus was more on asset 
quality than purely just chasing market share. Thus the level of 
growth in the loan book was 24 percent in 2005 and this decreased 
to 16 percent in 2006. The growth then increased to 34 percent in 
2007. 
• Stanbic Bank showed relatively low growth of 22 percent in 2005. 
This increased substantially in the following two years with the 
growth rate in 2006 being 34 percent and 2007 showed rapid growth 
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The rankll1gs for asset qu ality reflect that NtC Bank has the best asset 
quality based all the c(lteria. Stanbic Bank IS placed sesond ill the 
ran kings but quite a distal1ce off the first placed NIC Bal1k. 
Thereafter the th ird placed bal1k is K-Rep Ballk which is a bit of a 
surprise but it was aided by the lower growth multiple relative to its 
selested peer base excludil1g NIC Bal1k_ Fourth ranked bank accordillg 
to asset quality is Diamond Tru st Bal1k alld thel1 CBA follows ill sixth 
place_ Eq uity Bal1k is the worst ranked bank accordillg to asset quality, 
4.3.2,6 Overall Quantitative Scores 
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• CBA scored the highest points for the quantitative factors as it scored 
the best in the liquidity factor and also scored relatively well in the 
profitability factor. 
• Stanbic Bank then followed as the second best quantitatively ranked 
bank due to scoring in the top two for efficiency and asset quality. 
• Diamond Trust Bank was the third best ranked quantitative bank and 
was ranked the best in profitability and also efficiency. These two 
categories have the lowest percentage weightings of all the categories. 
• NIC Bank was the fourth best ranked quantitative bank and performed 
the best in the asset quality factor. 
• Equity Bank was the fifth quantitatively ranked bank and performed the 
best in capital adequacy amongst its selected peer group. 
• K-Rep Bank was the worst bank based on quantitative factors and was 
in the top two banks for capital adequacy and in the top three for asset 
quality. 
4.3.3 Kenyan Bank Rankings 
After inputting all the variables, the banks relative scores and ranking is as 
follows: 
Bank Ranklngs Score Ranking 
Diamond Trust Bank 35.69 1 
NIC Bank 35.61 2 
Com mercial Bank of Africa 35.12 3 
EQuity Bank 34.62 4 
K-Rep Bank 30.45 5 
Stanbic Bank 29.28 6 
The results from the qualitative factors indicated that K-Rep Bank and Equity 
Bank scored the highest scores. These two banks were closely followed by 
Diamond Trust Bank and NIC Bank. K-Rep Bank scored well in the qualitative 
factors due to scoring the highest in the corporate governance and regulatory 
sectors. Equity Bank was tied in second place for the corporate governance 
sector and performed relatively well in the market share sector. 
The results from the quantitative factors indicated that CBA was the best 












descending order of Stanbic Bank, Diamond Trust Bank and NIC Bank. K-
Rep Bank was the laggard by a long distance in terms of the quantitative 
factors whilst Equity Bank scored the second lowest quantitative score, 
although it was only two points behind NIC Bank. 
Therefore on an overall basis Diamond Trust Bank was the best ranked bank 
in Kenya and was followed closely by NIC Bank. The difference between the 
two only amounted to 0.08 and is marginal. CBA was the third best ranked 
bank and was not to far from Diamond Trust Bank's score. The difference in 
the scores of Diamond Trust Bank and CBA only amounted to 0.57. The top 
four ranked banks reflected close scores and the differential between these 
banks was a marginal score of 1.07. K-Rep Bank and Stanbic Bank were the 
fifth and sixth ranked banks respectively and their scores were much lower 
than their peers. K-Rep Bank's overall score was adversely affected by the 
very low quantitative factor score achieved whilst Stanbic Bank's overall score 
was negatively impacted by having the lowest qualitative score. 
4.3.4 Comparison of Kenyan Banks to Capitec Bank Limited 
A comparison was completed where a South African bank, Capitec was input 
into the quantitative factors only to ascertain the validity of the quantitative 
factor outcome. 
Capitec has being rated A2.za by Moody's on a local currency basis and thus 
one would have expected that Capitec would perform better in the quantitative 
factors than the lower rated Kenyan banks. 
This was confirmed by the outputs of the model and the following table 
represents the pOints scored under the quantitative factors: 
Bank Quanltltatlve Ranklngs Fin Score Ranking 
Capitec Bank 18.95 1 
Commercial Bank of Africa 15.16 2 
Stanbic Bank 13.12 3 
Diamond Trust Bank 12.95 4 
NIC Bank 12.42 5 
Egui!}t Bank 10.78 6 












4.4 Nigerian Bank Assessment 
The banks included in the methodology for Nigeria are as follows: 
(a) First Bank of Nigeria ("FBN") 
(b) Guaranty Trust Bank ("GTB") 
(c) Intercontinental Bank ("ICB") 
(d) Oceanic Bank ("ONB") 
(e) Stanbic IBTC Bank ("SBK") 
An analysis of the component parts of the methodology will follow and then 
conclude with the bank's relative scores that will enable the banks to be 
ranked in descending order. 
The methodology calls for the financial information to be collected over a 
rolling five year period. For the Kenyan assessment the financial information 
available allowed a rolling three period to be used. To obtain financial 
information for Nigeria proved to be more difficult and thus only a two year 
period is input into the methodology. Thus over the next few years the model 
will be populated with five years of data as the financial data is released and 
input into the model. The different year ends of the Nigerian banks also made 
the assessment more complex as the availability of the financial information is 
at different periods within the calendar year and then at different years as we". 
4.4.1 Qualitative Factors 
4.4.1.1 Corporate Governance 





Related Party Transactions 
















Scor. SCore Score 
4.00 2.50 0.50 
2.53 2.12 2.67 
8.00 8.00 8.00 
4.00 3.50 4.00 
• FBN, GTB and ICB scored the highest with ownership being 
widespread. Not one shareholder accounted for more than a ten 












• ONB scored an overall score of 2.5 due to the fact that the bank 
ownership was concentrated with the largest shareholder controlling 
more than 25 percent in the first year and then just below 25 percent 
in the following year. 
• SBK performed the worst on this sub-set as it had a large majority 
owner, Standard Bank Group Limited ("SBG"). SBG initially had in 
excess of 75 percent of Stanbic Bank (Nigeria) Limited and after 
they merged the bank with IBTC in September 2007, SBG 
maintained 50.1 percent of the new SBK. 
ii. Number of non-executive directors is greater than the number of 
executive directors 
• FBN performed the worst amongst its selected peer group here as 
the number of executive directors exceeded the number of non-
executive directors. FBN percentage of non-executive directors 
was maintained only at 47 percent of the board. 
• GTB was the third best bank for the criteria with 55 percent of the 
board comprising non-executive directors. 
• ICB was the second best bank with a good level of 63 percent of the 
board being non-execu ive directors. 
• OCB only managed to maintain a 53 percent level of non-executive 
directors on the board. 
• SBK was the best bank in the criteria with 67 percent of their board 
being non-executive directors. 
iii. Are Audit Committees in place? 
• All the banks scored eight points as the audit committees are made 
up of only non-executive directors and the chairman also is a non-
executive director. 
The banks in Nigeria all had audit committees where the voting 
members are non-executive directors. The chairman of the said 












IV, Tile Scope of Related Party Tran<;1C tions 
• FBN did not disclose any detailed figures rega rd ing their third pariy 
transactions and the note to the annual report was brief and just 
stated that all transadions were carried out on an arms length basis. 
Therefore FBN' s smre is negatively affected as they have not 
scored any points in this sub-set 
• GTB ICB and SBK both scored maximum points as their related 
pariy loans amounted to well below the ten percent of capital level. 
• ONB scored the lowest as in 2007 its related party loans inneased 
to between 11 percent and 20 percent of capital In 2006 its related 
pariy loans to capital was below 10 percent. 
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IC B scores the highest overal l mrporate governance score, followed 
close ly by GTB ONB and SBK score the third and fourth highest 
scores, whilst FBN has the worst overa ll corporate governarx:e score. 
4.4.1.2 Market share 
Market share calculation was not co S easy as with the Kenyan banks who 
all have the same year end, In Nigeria. most of the banks have different 












the Bank Supervision Annual Report published by the CNB has been used 
to extract the relevant data. However this data is provided as at the end of 
December each year and provides information relating to total assets and 
total deposits by each bank. Thus this data have been input into a 
spreadsheet to obtain the total banking sectors assets and deposits. From 
here each bank's market share is calculated by using a two year average 
for each bank divided by the two year average for the whole banking 
sector. 
i. Market share as per total assets 
• FBN scored the second highest in this sub-set with solid seven and 
a half percent of total banking assets. 
• GTB's market share of six percent has remained stable over the 
assessment period and is the second worst amongst its selected 
peers. 
• ICB increased its market share slightly and is the third best bank in 
this sub-set with six and a half percent. 
• ONB showed strong growth in its market share and is the best 
performing bank in this sub-set with eight and a half percent. 
• SBK has the smallest market share amongst its peers and actually 
lost some ground in 2007 when their market share declined by one 
percent to a low level of two percent of total assets. 
ii. Market share as per total deposits 
• FBN scored the second highest in this sub-set with solid 
percentages of total banking deposits. 
• GTB's market share has remained stable over the assessment 
period and is the second worst amongst its selected peers. 
• ICB increased its market share slightly and is the third best bank in 
this sub-set. 
• ONB showed strong growth in its market share and is the best 












• SBK has the smallest market share amongst its peers however in 
this sub-set they managed to increase their market share by one 












ONB scored the highest overal l market share score, fo llowed by FBN 
and 1GB. GTB had the fourth highest score and SBK had the worst 
overa ll market share score_ 
4.4.1.3 Financiill Reporting 
• Al l the banks scored four points here as they are regulated to produce 
their annual report within three months of tOOir respective year ends in 
terms of statute. All the banks complied with statue and published their 
results within the three month period. 
4.4.1.4 Regulatory Environment 
, , 
This aspect is high ly subjective and was considered after taking into 
account too role that the respective bank plays in the economy and from 











• FBN and ICB scored the highest scores due to the size of their 
franchises and the significant role that they play in the weater economy 
in general. 
• GTB and ONB have increased their percentage of perceived support 
from the CBN since the first year of assessment. ONB has a much 
better chance of continuing this trend as they now account for len 
percent of the banking sectors' total assets and total deposits 
• SBK would have to rely on support from their majority owner, SBG 
4.4.1.5 Overall Qualitative Scores 
• 
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ICB scored the hi(Jhest in terms of the qualitative factors ~Jiven that they 
scored the highest in the corporate governance sector and also the 
greater chance of Central Bank support. 
• GTB was the second stron(Jest bank based on the qualitative factors 
' .... ith the second highest score for corporate governance. 
• ONB was ranked third ·In terms of qualitative factors and its best 
performancp was in the market share segment 
• FBN was fourlh followed by SBK SBK was adversely affected in the 
corporate governance sector due to its majority ownership by the South 
African bankin(J (Jroup. SBG and ttlus no perceived support woulrl be 












4.4.2 Quantitative Factors 
4.4.2.1 Profitability 
Frontlar Country BlInk FlmBllnk 
Gu.-.nty 
Intercontinental O_1e Stanble 




Blllk ft 8c:ont 8c:ont 8c:ora 8c:ont ProfItIIbIIIty 100000allnll profit Ilrior to ImDBIrmentsllotal assets 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.14 
Net Income before tax/totaIincome 1.33 2.00 1.54 1.70 
i. Operating profit prior to impairments divided by total assets 
• FBN increased its operating profrt before impairments to total assets 
ratio from three to three and a half percent. This was the second 
worst overall score for this sub-set amongst its selected peer group. 
• GTB's ratio decreased from four percent to 3.4 percent. 
• ICB's ratio remained relatively constant at approximately four 
percent. 
• ONB's ratio decreased from three and a half percent to 2.7 percent 
and it scored the worst overall score for this sub-set. 
• SBK increased its ratio from just over five percent to close to six 
percent and scored the best amongst its selected peer group. 
ii. Net income before tax margin 
• FBN increased its net income margin from 28 percent to 31 percent 
but this was the lowest amongst its selected peer group. 
• GTB's net income margin increased by a marginal one percent to 45 
percent. GTB scored the second highest in this sub-set due to its 
stable and high ratio. 
• ICB increased its net income margin from 32 percent to 36 percent. 
• ONB reflected an increased net income ratio from 35 percent to 40 
percent. 
• SBK scored the highest score in this sub-set and this was despite a 
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On an overall basis for profitability, SBK was the top ranked bank, 
followed by GTB and ONB The fourth ranked bank was ICB and then 
FBN Bank was ranked in fifth place. 
4.4.2.2 Liquidity 
• FBN's ratio of total deposi s to total loans reflects a declining trend from 
three times cover to below two percent cover in the last assessment 
period. 
• GTB has maintained a stable ratio of total deposits to total loans at two 
and a halftimes cover Thus GTB has scored the highest score in this 
sub-set 
• ICB increased its total deposits to total loans cover from 1 7 times to 
2.4 times. However this was not enough and in this sub-set ICB has 
the second worst cover after SBK. 
• 
• 
ONB scored the second highest liquidity variable however its total 
loans cover did decrease from three times to two times. This was 
largely due to the large increase in loans advanced. 
SBK scored the lowest score for this sub-set and their total deposits to 
total loans was well below those of its selected peer group. SBK's 












4.4.2.3 Capital adequacy 
Frontier Country Bank First Bank Guaranty Intercontinental Oceanic Stanblc 
• Nigeria of Nigeria Trust Bank Bank IBTC Bank Bank 
8COnt 8COnt 8COnt 8COra 8COnt 
Capital Adequacy ITier 1 Ratio C%) 1.91 1.32 2.06 1.84 
ISharehoiders EaultvlT otal Assets 1.10 0.79 1.24 1.06 
i. Tier 1 ratio 
The Central Bank of Nigeria minimum requirement for the tier 1 ratio is 
ten percent. 
• FBN increased its tier 1 ratio substantially from 17 percent to 39 
percent. This was due to the issue of additional ordinary shares 
which increased share capital and premium substantially. The offer 
was so over subscribed that four and a half billion shares were 
issued. 
• GTB's tier 1 ratio decreased from 22 percent to 17 percent. This 
was due to the larger increase in risk weighted assets than 
compared to the increase in capital. 
• The tier 1 ratio of ICB decreased from 36 percent to 25 percent and 
was due to the larger increase in risk weighted assets as the 
balance sheet grew strong during the reporting period. The ratio is 
still well above the regulatory minimum. 
• ONB almost doubled their tier 1 ratio from 18.5 percent to 36 
percent. This was due to a public offering that was hugely 
oversubscribed and the banks raised N175 billion when they 
intended to only raise N54 billion. This capital is required to support 
the strong growth in the balance sheet of the bank. 
• SBK has the highest tier 1 ratio amongst its selected peer group. 
The ratio has remained relatively stable at around the 45 percent 
level. This extremely high but also provides comfort as the non-
performing loans percentage is also high. 
ii. Shareholders equity divided by total assets 
• FBN increased their shareholders equity to total assets ratio from 


















GTB's shareholders equity to total assets ratio decreased marginally 
from 13 percent to ten percent 
ICB reflected a decrease in their ratio from 22 percent to 14 percent 
and was due to the larger increase in total assets during the 
reporting period. 
ONB doubled its shareholders equity to total assets ratio from ten 
percent to 21 percent due to the large capital raising that was 
undertaken during the last reporting period. 
• SBK's ratio declined from 31 percent to 27 percent due to a 33 
percent increase in total assets as opposed to a 17 percent increase 
in shareholders equity 





SBK has the highest capital adequacy ratio but this would be expected as 
their non performing loans ratio is also the highest. The high level of 
capital would provide some comfort to investors. ICB and FBN have the 
next highest level of capital adequacy scores respectively. ONB follows 
closely behind FBN, whilst GTB has the lowest overall capital adequacy 
score. 
4.4.2.4 Efficiency 











• FBN has managed to decrease its cost to income ratio from 49 percent 
to 44 percent. This is now the lowest cost to income ratio amongst its 
selected peers. 
• GTB's cost to income ratio only declined marginally from 56 percent to 
55 percent. 
• ICB managed to decrease its cost to income ratio from 61 percent to 58 
percent but this ratio still remains stubbornly high. 
• ONB showed a sound reduction their cost to income ratio from 59 
percent to 51 percent. 
• SBK's cost to income ratio increased from a low level of 34 percent to 
46 percent. This was due to a 241 percent increase in operating costs, 
which was largely attributable to a 286 percent increase in other 
operating expenses. No further detailed information is provided in the 
annual report. 





Frontl.r Country Bank AI .... m.nt • Nlg.rla 
ot NIg.rIa Trust Bank Bank IBTC 
Bank Bank 
Score Score Score Score Score 
AI •• t Quality INPLslGross Loans -0.24 -0.34 -0.34 -0.46 -2.24 1% Change In Loan Growth -3.58 -1.78 -3.47 -7.27 -0.89 
i. Non-performing loans to gross loans 
• FBN's non-performing loans to total loans ratio decreased 
marginally from 2.2 percent to 1.6 percent. 
• GTB ratio showed an improvement from 3.3 percent to two percent. 
• ICB has to maintain their non-performing loans ratio at a constant 
three percent. 
• ONB decreased their non-performing loans ratio from four percent to 
three percent, however this could just be the "denominator effect" 
due the massive increase in total loans. Only the future will 
determine if their asset quality has indeed improved and thus the 
second sub-set of the asset quality category is important. 
• SBK decreased their non performing loans from a high of 22 percent 
to 14 percent, which still remains high especially when compared to 












II Percentage ck·mg8 ill the growth of loans 
• FBN's increase in loan gmw1h was subdued at an initial rate of 22 
percent however this increased dramatically in the last reportirg 
period tD a high level of 110 percent 
• GTB has had a mene stable IDan gro'Nlh Df 29 and 37 percent in 
2006 and 2007 respectively Thus the bank scores the best elVeraii 
in the asset quality sector 
• 1GB increase in their loan grQl,\1h was relatively stable but still high at 
63 and 66 percent for the two reporting periods. 
• ONB has had the largest increase in their loan gro\\1h from 27 
percent to a massive 242 percent. This impacts negatively on their 
overall asset quality scene and thus leaves the bank in the last place 
amongst its seleGied peer gmup. 
• SBKs gro\\1h in loans increased from 13 percent to 20 percent and 







GTB has the best overall asset quality score and is followed by SBK 
SBK has the worst non-performing loans to gross loans score but also 
the IDwest level of growth in their IDan book over the past three years. 
This enables SBK 10 score somewhat higher than expected in this 
segment. leB and FBN follow SBK 
ONB has the worst overelll asset qUellity score elS their percentelge 












future impaired loans if the huge growth is not tightly controlled and 
managed 
4.4.2.6 Overall quantitative scores 
B, n" 
• GTB scored the highest points for the quantitative factors as it scored 
the best in the liquidity factor and the asset quality factor 
• 
• 
FBN then followed as the second best quantitatively ranked bank due 
to scoring in the top two for efficiency and in the top three for liquidity 
and capital adequacy. 
ONB was the third best ranked bank quantitatively and was ranked in 
the top two for liquidity and in the top three for profitability and also 
efficiency. These two categories have the lowest percentage 
weightings of all the categories. 
• ICB was the fourth best ranked quantitative bank and performed the 
second best in the capital adequacy factor. 
• SBK was the last ranked bank according to the quantitative factors 
despite performing the best in profitability, capital adequacy and 
efficiency. Profitability and efficiency carry the lowest weights for the 
various criteria and SBK was negatively affected due to the very low 













4.4.3 Nigerian Bank Rankings 
After inputting all the variables the banks relative scores and ranking is as 
follows: 
Bank Rankings Score Ranking 
Guaranty Trust Bank 57.92 1 
First Bank of Nigeria 53.68 2 
Intercontinental Bank 52.36 3 
Oceanic Bank 51.07 4 
Stanbic IBTC Bank 38.40 5 
The results from Nigerian bank assessment showed a less concentrated 
distribution of scores when compared with the Kenyan bank assessment. 
The results from the qualitative factors indicated that ICB scored the highest 
score. GTB and ONB scored the second and third highest scores respectively. 
SBK scored the lowest qualitative score. ICB scored well in the qualitative 
factors due to scoring the highest in the corporate governance and regulatory 
sectors. SBK scored worst in the market share sector and second worst in 
the corporate governance sector. 
The results from the quantitative factors indicated that GTB was the best 
performing bank and was followed closely by FBN. ONB was the third best 
performing bank followed by ICB and SBK respectively. GTB scored the 
highest pOints as it was the best performing bank in both the liquidity and 
asset quality factors. SBK scored the lowest score as it was heavily penalised 
in the liquidity sub-set as its total deposit to total loans ratio was much lower 
than its peers. 
Therefore on an overall basis GTB was the best ranked bank in Nigeria and 
was followed by FBN, who scored 4.23 less points than GTB. ICB was the 
third best ranked bank. The difference in score between FBN and ICB 
amounted to 1.32. OCB and SBK were the fourth and fifth ranked banks 
respectively. SBK's overall score was much lower than its peers. GTB was 
the most consistent performer over both the qualitative and quantitative 












scores for both the qualitative and quantitative factors and the differential 
between GTB and SBK's scores was a large 19.52. 
4.4.4 Comparison of Nigerian Banks to Capitec Bank Limited 
The comparison of the Nigerian banks to Capitec based on solely the 
quantitative factors yielded the following interesting outcome: 
Bank Quanltltatlve Ranking. Fin Score Ranking 
Guaranty Trust Bank 33.36 1 
First Bank of Nigeria 31.10 2 
Oceanic Bank 28.01 3 
Intercontinental Bank 25.25 4 
Capitec Bank 18.95 5 
Stanbic IBTC Bank 18.91 6 
All the Nigerian banks with the exception of SBK scored higher than Capitec. 
The relative higher scores for the majority of the Nigerian banks are due to the 
fact that the structure of the Nigerian banking industry differs from that of the 
South African and Kenyan banking industry. In Nigeria the amount of total 
deposits far exceeds the level of total loans whereas in South Africa and 
Kenya the value of loans usually exceeds that of deposits. As the liquidity 
factor has such a large category weight in the quantitative sector and then 
also the largest overall weight in the model, it would be prudent to do a 
comparison excluding this variable which causes a material distortion in 
comparing banks from other countries and differing industry characteristics. 
The comparison of the Nigerian banks to Capitec based on the quantitative 
factors excluding the liquidity factor yielded the following results: 
Bank Quanititative Rankings 
Fin Score Ranking 
excl. liquidity 
Stanbic IBTC Bank 2.28 1 
Capitec Bank 1.96 2 
Guaranty Trust Bank -1.18 3 
First Bank of Nigeria -2.12 4 
Intercontinental Bank -2.35 5 
Oceanic Bank -6.30 6 
SBK scored the highest score and is followed closely by Capitec who only 
scores 0.32 points less than SBK. The rest of the Nigerian banks yielded 
negative scores for the quantitative factors excluding the liquidity factor. The 












cost to income ratio and also its loan growth has been most subdued in 
comparison with its peers who have shown dramatic loan growth and thus 
lowered their asset quality factor scores_ 
The assessments above pose a question of are the Nigerian banks less riskier 
investments in comparison to their Kenyan counterparties and the lower tier 
banks in South Africa. The Nigerian banks have as their only real risk of 
default a run on the bank. Whilst this may be true it has to be acknowledged 
that banking is largely based on confidence and sentiment does not always 
only react to core fundamentals and can be driven by fear and panic Thus 
whilst Nigeria has a simplistic banking model at present, the extremely rapid 
growth in their banking industry does create and pose additional risks and 
until the industry has matured and is directly comparable, the belief is that the 
Nigerian banks do not pose less risk than Kenyan banks nor lower tier South 
African banks. 
4.5 Summary 
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The first six banks in the above graph are the Kenyan banks assessed and 











The Nigerian banks scored higher scores than the Kenyan banks due to the 
fact that the structure of the Nigerian banking industry has a fundamental 
difference from both the Kenyan and South African banking industries. The 
difference is that Nigeria has a banking industry that is most cash flush and as 
such the amount of total deposits held in the banks currently exceeds the 
amount of total loans advanced. Thus the Nigerian banks scored especially 
high in the liquidity category and this has boosted their quantitative and overall 
scores substantially. 
The first four Kenyan banks are quite evenly rated and ranked whilst K-Rep 
Bank and Stanbic Bank Kenya are the lower ranked banks. K-Rep Bank is 
ranked lower as it quantitative scores are much lower as it is engaged in the 
higher risk segment of the Kenyan banking market providing essentially 
microfinance loans to clients. K-Rep Bank did score the highest in the 
qualitative section, however this section only accounts for 40 percent of the 
overall score and it was not sufficient to counteract the low score in the 
quantitative section. Stanbic Bank Kenya scored so poorly in the qualitative 
section that even though the bank had the second highest quantitative section 
score, it was only able to finish last in the rankings. 
Amongst the Nigerian bank  the differential between the scores was more 
pronounced and GTB finished the assessment as the best ranked bank with 
the top score achieved in the quantitative section and the second highest 
score in the qualitative section. The following three ranked banks were 
relatively closely ranked with the overall score differential of less then three 
points. The bottom ranked bank was SBK and was due to the worst 
performance in both the qualitative and quantitative sections. 
4.6 Spread Comparison 
To conclude, a comparison was envisaged between the spreads yielded by 
the Kenyan and Nigerian banks debt issuance. Ultimately the aim would be to 












The banks in Kenya largely have an inefficient banking model and the usage 
of debt is not widespread, with the exception of K-Rep Bank and Equity Bank. 
The table below sets out the Kenyan Banks' debt issuance to total assets as 
at 31 st December 2007: 
Debt I Total Assets 
K-Rep Bank has the highest percentage of debt to total assets and this is 
largely due to the legacy that it was historically a non governmental 
organisation that concentrated on the upliftment of the people. Thus K-Rep 
Bank when it was still a non governmental organisation was funded largely by 
loans from development agencies and the government. The bulk of K-Rep 
Bank debt currently relates to shareholders of the bank in line with the mission 
of the bank. 
Equity Bank has increased its footprint and operations in Kenya and has 
borrowed funds. However the detail relating to the said borrowings is lacking. 
Needless to say the utilisation of debt to finance assets in the other banks is 
low or even non-existent. 
The Kenyan banking industry is thus reminiscent of the developed world 
banking industry of 50 years ago when assets where funded solely by 
depoSits and capital. 
The banks in Nigeria largely have an inefficient banking model as well and the 
usage of debt is not widespread, with the exception of GTB. 
The table below sets out the Nigerian Banks' debt issuance to total assets as 
at the respective year ends: 
First 
Guaranty Trust Intercontinental 
Stanbic 
















GTB's debt issuance is made up largely of loans from development 
institutions namely the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), European 
Investment Bank ("EIB"), African Development Bank ("ADB"), GTB Finance 
BV ("GTBF") and FMO. FMO is the development bank of the Netherlands. 
The Nigerian banking industry is thus reminiscent of the developed world 
banking industry of 50 years ago when assets where funded solely by 
deposits and capital. 
In both the case of Kenya and Nigeria the majority of debt incurred is from 
development banks and or agencies and thus a comparison of the spread 
yields will not be directly comparable. 
For interest sake, Capitec has a listed floating rate bond issue of R11 0 million 
and a fixed rate bond issue of R380 million. Thes  three year bond are listed 
on the Bond Exchange of South Africa and were issued on the 6th May 2008. 
The redemption date is the 6th May 2011. The United States Government 











Chapter 5 Conclusion 
Frontier markets have attracted the attention of South African companies in an 
attempt to diversify their earnings base away from sole reliance on South 
Africa. The frontier markets appear to be a more viable and long term option 
for South African companies as these frontier countries have shown 
remarkable growth over recent times. Setting up a competitive operation in a 
frontier country is regarded as being easier than establishing operations in the 
developed world. The developed world poses the additional problem of 
distance whereas the frontier markets bring their own unique problems and 
challenges, especially in the corporate governance area. However the risk 
and return from the frontier markets would in all likelihood provide much 
greater net returns. 
Thus the ability to be able to generate a model through which the banks in the 
frontier countries can be critically assessed is regarded as an essential 
component for future frontier market penetration. The bank questionnaire's 
framework was based on the Fitch bank questionnaire, which was adjusted to 
make it more relevant to the pressing issues of corporate governance and 
operational management that the frontier markets would have to manage. 
The response from the frontier banks was extremely poor. The information to 
be obtained from the questionnaire was supposed to form the base from 
which to begin to assess the frontier market banks. However due to the poor 
response this was no longer possible and full reliance was placed on the 
information gained from the financial statements of the banks and also the 
annual reports of the various Central Banks. Thus the model becomes the 
overall assessment tool. The model itself has as its framework the Moody's 
bank assessment methodology with both qualitative and quantitative factors 
being considered, and this was adjusted to ensure that the factors considered 












This paper has indicated that further research is required into the assessment 
of banks in frontier markets, however a well considered methodology to 
critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of banks is possible. 
The model has produced consistent results that would have been expected 
from the various interactions with stakeholders and of the information obtained. 
The greatest insight from the research has been how inefficient the banking 
systems in these countries are and that banking in these countries remain at 
the level of taking deposits and then granting loans whilst maintaining a core 
capital component. This is inefficient and is dilutive to shareholders as if the 
banks used increased debt then they would be able to generate an increased 
return for shareholders by optimising their capital structures. It will still take 
many years in the opinion of the writer to integrate these frontier banking 
systems within the global banking system to achieve the same levels of 
products offered and the use of instruments to optimise the returns generated 
from the assets and capital. 
The risk and reward consideration for the frontier banks is not regarded at this 
stage to be equitable for a large foreign investor. Although a methodology is 
in place to rank the relative strengths of the frontier banks the investment 
decision is constrained by the unsophisticated banking industry in the Kenya 
and Nigeria and the undeveloped state of the capital markets in these 
countries. The process of price discovery is limited at best as the number of 
banks issuing debt is limited and when debt is issued it is usually to 
development banks and agencies. A positive investment decision would only 
become a possibility once the banks start gearing their balance sheets to 
maximise returns and the debt capital markets have become fully operational 
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Annexure - Ranking Methodology Results 
Kenyan Banks 
Commercial Bank of Africa 
CIIDgory Overa. 
Sub- OV ..... 1 
F8Ctar CBA 
Wlight Weight - Wlight 
] 
1005 2008 2007 2008 2009 3yrA.,. Score 
OwnershiD 25.00% 4.00% - - - - -
Governance 40.00% 16.00% Nan-Ex1lCltive > Executive 25.00% 4.00% 66.67 66.67 66.67 
66.67 2.67 
Audit Cornm __ 25.00% 4.00% 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 8.00 
Qu8llbltlve FIICto .... 40% 
Related Party Transactions 25.00% 4.00% 75.00 100.00 75.00 83.33 3.33 
J MIlrUtSh8re 40.00% 16.00% Per Total Assets 50.00% 8.00% 4.97 5.50 5.27 
524 0.42 
Per Total Il800sIs 50.00% 8.00% 6.82 7.14 6.46 6.81 0.54 
f 
Flllllncl8l R8IIOIIIna 10.00% 4.00% Financial InfOrmation TImeliness 100.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.00 
R8IIuI8IDrv E~nt 10.00% 4.00% Support from CenIra Balk 100.00% 4.00% 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 1.00 
Prolltllbliity 15.00% 9.00% IlII10r to ImoeinnentsllDtal assels 50.00% 4.50% 1.54 
3.09 3.55 2.72 0.12 
II Net income before taxIIDtaIlncane 50.00% 4.50% 19.94 
54.42 46.98 40.45 1.82 
J UaUiditv 22.50% 13.50% TDIIII DeDDslts I Total Loans 100.00% 13.50% 
149.56 139.61 128.87 139.35 18.81 
Quanlbltlve FIICtora 60% jc.pttaI AdeqUKy 22.50% 13.50% T .. 1 Ratio % 50.00% 6.75% 12.20 14.84 13.47 13.50 0.91 
ShanIhaIders EQull\f otaI AsseIs 50.00% 6.75% 7.74 9.93 1123 9.63 0.65 
IEfllclenev 10.00% 6.00% Costlt1cane RatIo 100.00% 6.00% -M.43 -6429 .02.15 .07.29 -3.44 
!A-tQuellty 30.00% 18.00% NPlsIGross Loans 
70.00% 12.60% _'.65 .0.32 -4.99 .0.99 ~.75 
% Cha~ in Loan Growth 30.00% 5.40% -116.89 -23.46 -24.32 -64.89 -2.96 
rrot8l Score 35.12 . 









1: 1005 2008 2007 2008 2009 3yrAve Score 
I o-shiD 25.00% 4.00% SO.OO SO.OC SO.OO SO.OO 2.00 
J 
Corporale Governance 40.00% 16.00% Non-Executlve > Executive 25.00% 4.00% 70.00 70. 70.00 
70.00 2.60 
Audt Commltt8es 25.00% 4.00% 200.00 2OO.DC 200.00 200.00 8.00 
QualitalYe Factors 40% 
ReIaIad Party Trawac:tions 25.00% 4.00% 100.0 100.OC 100.00 100.00 4.00 ... MarkIltSh_ 40.00% 16.00% Per TolBI Assets SO.OO% 8.00% 2.7 3.1 4.52 3.49 0.28 c 
Per Tolal Deposits d'I SO.OO% 8.00% 3. 3.71 5.25 4.17 0.33 
i 
Flnanclal-AAnOrtliiii- 10.00% 4.00% Flnanclallnfannatlon Imeliness 100.00% 4.1K1'111 100. 100. DC 100.00 100.00 4.00 
R8IIulll..." Envlronmant 10.00% 4.00% SUpport from Ceritral Bank 100.00% 4.1K1'111 25. 25.00 SO.OO 33.33 1.33 
'" I Profit Drior to ImDllinnentsltolBl assets 2.87 3.40 3.15 0 ProfItability 15.00% 9.00% SO.OO% 4.50% 3.17 0.14 u .. Net Income before taxItotallncome SO.OO% 4.50% 37.15 46.75 44.82 42.91 1.93 
f Llauldltv 22.50% 13.50% Total Deooslls I Total loin! 100.00% 13.50% 113.21 110.38 111.91 111.83 15.10 
E! QuanltalYe Factors 60% Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% Tier 1 Rallo (%) SO.OO% 6.75% 11.10 18.50 19.10 15.57 1.05 IL Slwehoklars EaultvII otaI Assets SO.OO% 6.75% 10.08 13.19 15.22 12.83 0.87 
EffIcIenc:v 10.00% 6.00% Costltncome RatIo 100.00% 6.00% -59.09 -50.99 .01.47 -03.85 -3.23 
Auet Quality 30.00% 18.00% NPls/Gross loin! 70.00% 12.80% 
-2.53 -2.30 -1.73 -2.19 ~:28 
% Chanae n Loan Growth 3O.00K. 5.40% -44.57 -34.06 -67.59 -48.74 -2.63 













Category Overall Sub- Overell 
Fec:tor equity Bank Wllght Weight 
Walaht 
Wllght 
C 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 3yrAve sc:or. • 25.00% 4.00% 50.00 75.00 75.00 66.67 2.67 
I Corporate Governance 40.00% 16.00% Non-Executlva > Executive 25.00% 4.00% 89.00 89.00 89.00 89.00 3.56 IAudit Committees 25.00% 4.00% 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 8.00 
.! Qualitative Factors 40% Related Partv Tnnactions 25.00% 4.00% 75. 100.00 100. 91.67 3.67 
~ IIIrkeISh_ 40.00% 16.00% Par Total AssIIIB 50.00% 8.00% 1. 2.94 6. 
3.64 0.31 c 
II Par Total D8D08Its 50.00% 8.00% 2. 3.51 5. 3.85 0.31 
i Flnll'lclel Reportlna 10.00% 4.00% Rnaldlll InfonnaIIon Timeliness 100.00% 4.00% 100. 100.00 100. 
100.00 4.00 
IReaulatorv Envlnmmll'lt 10.00% 4.00% Suaoort from Centrlll EIIri: 100.00% ~ 25. 25.00 50.0 33.33 1-:33 
" Ooeralina Drolit Drior to ImDllinnenta/kJtal assets 5.45 6.17 5.37 0.24 8 ProfItabHIty 15.00% 9.00% 50.00% 4.50% 4.50 
I 
Net Income before taxIIDtaIlncome 50.00% 4.50% 27.77 32.71 40.85 33.78 1.52 
Llauldltv 22.50% 13.50% Total 0.....118 I T 0IIII Loans 100.00% 13.50% 118.76 126.13 109.96 118.28 15.97 
e QUll'litettve Factors 6O'Xo Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% Tier 1 Ratio 1%1 50.00% 6.75% 0.00 14.00 46.00 20.00 1.35 ... ShInhoIders -/Total Assets 50.00% 6.75% 13.91 10.99 28.06 17.66 1.19 
EfflclII'ICY 10.00% 6.00% Costnncome Ratio 100.00% 6.00% -65.34 -&.34 -59.40 -62.89 -3.78 
AuetQuailty 30.00% 18.00% NPLs/Gross Loens 70.00% 12.60% 
-8.83 -4.97 -4.45 -6.06 .{J.77 
% r:hanaa in LoIl1 Growllt 30.00% 5.40% -78.26 -97.64 -99.79 -91.97 -4.97 
Total Sc:ore 34.62 
KR - ep B an k 
Category Overllli 
Sub-




2006 2007 2008 2009 3yrAve SCore 
25.00% 4.00% 75. 75.00 75. 75.00 3.00 
I Corporate Governll'lC8 40.00% 16.00% 
Non-Executive > ExecuIi\Ie 25.00% 4.00% 92. 92.00 92. 92.00 3.66 
AudltCom~ 25.00% 4.00% 200. 200.00 200. 200.00 8.00 
"" Qualltattve Factors 40% 
Related Pa1Y Transactions 25.00% 4.00% 100. 100.00 100. 100.00 4.00 
~ lIerkatSh_ 40.00% 16.00% Per Total AssIIIB 50.00% 8.00% O. 0.77 O. 0.76 0.06 c 
Per Total D8D08Its 50.00% 8.00% II O. 0.72 0.81 0.68 0.05 
i Flllll'lcIat Reportlna 10.00% 4.00% 
Rnaldlll Information TImeliness 100.00% 4.00% 100. 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.00 
Reaulatorv Envlronmll'lt 10.00% 4.00% Suooort from Centrlll EIIri: 1 oo:lIO'!C. 4.00% 50. 50.00 50.00 50.00 2.00 
" :Joerallna Drolit Drior to ImDllirmentsltollll assets 50.00% 4.50% 1.68 3.34 3.63 2.88 0.13 8 ProfItability 15.00% 9.00% 
I 
Net Income before taxIIDtaIlncome 50.00% 4.50% 10.77 19.37 17.21 15.78 0.71 
Jauldltv 22.50% 13.50% ToIIII o.x.lIs I T 0IIII Loans 100.00% 13.50% 68.91 110.79 110.89 76.22 10.29 
~ QUII'Iltatlve Factors 6O'Xo Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% .... 1 Ratio % 50.00% 6.75% 0.00 zo.53 17.50 12.68 0.86 ShInhoIders -/T0IIII Assets 50.00% 6.75% 21.14 17.20 14.46 17.60 1.19 
EfflclII'ICY 10.00% 6.00% Costnncome Ratio 100.00% 6.00% -86.99 -77.78 -76.66 -80.54 -4.83 
AsletQueity 30.00% 18.00% NPLs/Gross Loans 70.00% 12.60% 
-4.47 -4.;,0 -8.30 -5.69 .{J.72 
% ChIIIoe In LoIl1 Growllt 30.00% 5.40% -20.06 -53.03 -36.12 -36.40 -1.97 














Sub- ov ..... 
Factor NICBank Weight Weight 
W"-
Weight .. 2005 2006 2U01 2001 2009 3WAve -Score c: 
J 
25.00% 4.00% 75. 75. 75.00 75.00 3.00 
Corporate Govern_ 40.00% 16.00% Non-Ex8Qllive > Executive 25.00% 4.00% 80. 80. 80.00 80.00 
3.20 
AucIt Commlllees 25.00% 4.00% 200. 200. 200.00 200.00 8.00 
Qualitative Factora 40% 
Related Party TIWIS8CfkJns 25.00% 4.00% 75. 75. 100.00 83.33 3.33 ... 
Market Share 40.00% 18.00% Pw Total Assets 50.00% 8.00% 3. 3. 3.92 
3.74 0.30 
c: 
II Pw Total DeDasIbl 50.00% 8.00% 4. 4. 4.44 4.58 0.38 
i Financial RiiiiliiiiiiiI 10.00% 4.00% Fina1clallnfarmallon TImeliness 100.00% 4.00% 100. 100.0 100.00 
100.00 4.00 
!Reau'-lorv Environmn 10.00% 4.00% 5uPDOrt fnlm Central a.nk 100.00% 4.0M(, 25. 25.0 25.00 25.00 1-:00 
8 ProfItabHIty 15.00% 9.00% ofIt DrIor to inDllirmentsltotai assets 50.00% 4.50% 2.! 3.11 3.68 3.25 0.15 
I 
Net Income before taxIIDIaIlncome 50.00%· 4.50% 27.80 34.15 44.18 35.31 1.59 
Jauldltv 22.50% 13.50% ot8I 0-.18' TOIalloln 100.0MI. 13.50% 109.19 108.97 99.85 105.94 14.30 
QuanitailYe Factors 60% Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% I1ar 1 RIIio % 50.00% 8.75% O.W 
1J.30 15.84 9.71 0.86 
I&. Shareholders Elll.iIWTotaI Assets 50.00% 8.75% 13.49 11.65 15.15 13.43 0.91 
10.00% 8.00% COStllncome Rallo 100.00% 8.00% -«1:34 -59.12 -51.81 -57:03 -3.42 
jA-t Quality 30.00% 18.00% NPlsIGroA loin 70.00% 12.6O'lIo -3.90 -4.08 -2.J6 -3.44 -4.43 
% Chanaa in l.I&1 Growth 30.00% 5.40% -23.55 -18.21 -34.03 -24.80 -1.33 
otaIlIC:OI'8 35.61 
Stanbic Bank 
eae.gory 0venII Sub- ov ..... 
Weight WeIght Factor Weight 
Stanbic Bank 
W .... ht 
~ 2005 2006 2007 2G08 2009 3w Ave Score 
I 25.00% 4.00% 25.00 25 .. 25.00 25.00 1.00 
J 
Corpcnte Govern_ 40.00% 18.00% Non-Ex8Qllive > Executive 25.00% 4.00% 83.00 83. 83.00 
83.00 2.52 
AucltComm .... 25.00% 4.00% 200.00 2OO.1X 200.00 200.00 8.00 
Qualitative Factors 40% 
Related Party TlWllactions 25.00% 4.00% - -... 
Market Share 40.00% 18.00% Pw Total Assets 50.00% 8.00% 2.52 3.n 4.~ 3.55 0.28 c: 
II Pw Total 0-.115 50.00% 8.00% 3.25 4.81 5.3[ 4.48 0.38 
i Financial Reaartlna 10.00% 4.0M(, ina1clallnformallon Timeliness 100.00% 
4.0M(, 100.00 l00.1X 100.00 100.00 4.00 
Reaulllorv Environment 10.00% 4.00% 5UppOrt II'IlIn Central Bank 100.00% 4.00% - -
::0 
8 ProfItabUIty 15.00% 9.00% n--.., III"CIIIt DrIor to assets 5D.OO% 4.50% 3.18 4.18 3.83 3.72 0.17 
~ Net inCome before taxAoIaI income 50.00% 4.50% 32.07 42.08 45.41 39.85 1.79 
! Jauldltv 22.50% 13.50% otaI Daxlsils' TOIaIloIn 100.00% 13.50% 111.30 110.52 118.58 112.80 15.23 e Quanltatlve Factora 60% Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% TIer 1 RIIio (%) 50.00% 8.75% 15.62 18.69 13.28 15.20 1.03 I&. s Elll.itw'l otaI Assets 50.00% 8.75% 3.53 10.81 9.75 T1-:3!) 0.76 
10.00% 8.00% e RIIio 100.00% 8.00'II. -«i.1I4 -51.19 -50.18 ~73 -3.34 
Auet Quality 30.00% 18.00% NPLt/Gross LoenI 70.00% 12.6O'lIo -1.44 -2.02 -1.44 
-1.83 -4.21 
'" ~ in l.I&1 Growth 30.00% 5.40% -21.58 -33.53 -73.28 -42.79 -2.31 













First Bank of Ni 
Overall First BlInk of Nlg .... a • Weight 
i 2005 2008 7 2 Ave Score z Owners . 25.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 4.00 
i orporate Governance 40.00% 16.00% Non-executMI > executive 25.00% 4.00% 46.67 46.67 1.87 
E Audit Committ_ 25.00% 4.00% 200.00 200.00 8.00 
J Qualitative Factors 40% 
Related Pa Transactions 25.00% 4. % 
Market Share 40.00% 16.00% Per Total Assets .00% 8.00% 10. 3.92 
Per Total 50.00% 8.00% 11.50 4.09 ... 
10.00% 4.00% 1 c 1 
.I 10.00% 4.00% 4.00% 75.00 100.00 3.50 
! Profitability 15.00% 9.00% rtoim irmentsllotal assets 4.50% 3.06 3.52 0.15 
::I Net Income before taxilDtal iIcome 4.50% 28.36 30.71 1.33 
:3 22.50% 13.50% Tolal I Total Loans 13.50% 310.06 1 .11 33.22 
~ TIer 1 RatIo % 6.75% 17.40 39.20 1.91 • 22.50% 13.50% ~ Sharaholders E otaIAs8ets 6.75% 9.18 23.28 1.10 e 10.00% 6.00% Cost/Income RatIo 6.00% .29 -43.60 -2.79 u.. 
30.00% 18.00% NPlsIGross Loans 12.60% -2.23 -1.56 
.{I.24 
% Cha In Loan Growth 5.40% -21.78 -110.73 .56 
100% 100% ota 
Guaranty Trust Bank 
c.tagory Ovel'lln Sub- Oversll 
• Weight Weight F.:tor WeIght GWII'IInty Trust Bank 
I WMbht 2005 2008 2007 2yrAve &col'll . OwnershiD 25.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.00 
I Corporate Govemance 40.00% 16.00% Non-Executive > Executive 25.00% 4.00% 54.55 54.55 54.55 2.18 AudIt Convnitlees 25.00% 4.00% 200.00 200.00 200.00 8.00 
I Qualitative Factors 40% Related Party Transaclions 25.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.00 
i MIIIbt Share 40.00% 16.00% Per Total Assets 50.00% 8.00% 5.57 5.70 5.64 0.45 Per Total DeposIts 50.00% 8.00% 5.40 5.27 5.34 0.43 ... Flnanel .. ReDOrtina 10.00% 4.00% FlnanClaiTriformation T1mefinass 100.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 4:00 c 
.B R Environment 10.00% 4.00% SuPPOrt from eentnif Barik 100.00% 4.00% 25.00 50.00 37.50 1.50 
i Pi'ofIWbIIIty 15.00% 9.00% nrofit orIor to imnairmentsltotal assets 50.00% 4.50% 3.98 3.36 3.68 0.17 
8 
Net Income before taxItotallncome 50.00% 4.50% 44.09 44.85 44.47 2.00 
L1auldltv 22.50% 13.50% Total DeoosIts I Total Loans 100.00% 13.50% 256.26 255.34 255.80 34.53 
I Quanltatlve Factors 60% Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% Tier 1 Ratio % 50.00% 6.75% 22.40 16.60 19.50 1.32 Shareholders EOiJiiVIT otaI Assets 50.00% 6.75% 13.22 10.27 11.75 0.79 
u.. 10.00% 6.00% Costllncome RatIo 100.00% 6.00% -55.91 -55.15 -55.53 -3.33 
ASMtQuallty 30.00% 18.00% NPlsIGross Loans 70.00% 12.60% 
-3.37 -2.02 -2.70 .{I.34 
% Chanae In Loan Growth 30.00% 5.40% -28.52 -37,47 -32.99 -1.78 













Cat8gory Ow .... u 
Sub- Owenll , 
FIICIDr InIIIrConIInent.I Bank 
i Weight Weight WAInht WeIght 
11 2005 2008 2007 2008 2009 2yrAve Score z Ownntilo 25.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 4.00 . 100.00 
I 
Corporate G __ 
40.00% 16.00% 
Non-€xecutlw > ExecutIve 25.00% 4.00% 63.16 63.16 63.16 2.53 
AudIt Commil'- 25.00% 4.00% 200.00 200.00 200.00 8.00 
Qualitative F8CIIIn 40% 
Related Party Transactions 25.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.00 
Per Total Assets 50.00% 8.00% 6.19 7.28 6.73 0.54 M.utS .. 40.00% 16.00% 
Per Total DeDDsilS 50.00% 8.00% 6.35 7.41 6.88 0.55 ... 
Flnanclal_ 10.00% 4.00% Ananciallnfcnr!alion Tlmeli,,- 100.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.00 '" .II R-*IorY Environment 10.00% 4.00% SUpport fnxn CentnII Bank 100.00% 4.00% 75.00 100.00 87.50 3.50 
i Prulltabll~ 15.00% 9.00% Oneralina Dnlfit Drier to imoalnnanlSitatel assets 50.00% 4.50% 3.91 3.82 3.87 0.17 
8 
Net Income before texItotaIlnc:ame 50.00% 4.50% 32.17 36.34 34.25 1.54 
LlauIcIItv 22.50% 13.50% otaI Denosits I Talal Laans 100.00% 13.50% 169.24 239.57 204.40 27.59 
I Quanltatlve FlICIDrs 60% c.pItaI Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% ler1 Rallo % 50.00% 6.75% 36;20 24.85 30.53 2.06 SharahokIenI Eaulhll alai Assets 50.00% 6.75% 22.26 14.40 18.33 1.24 e EtIIc- 10.00% 6.00% Cost/Income Ratio 100.00% 6.00% ~.68 -67.60 -69.14 -3.55 II. 
AsHtQual~ 30.00% 18.00% 
NPLs/Gross Loena 70.00% 12.60% -2.55 -2.66 -2.70 -0.34 
% Chanae in Loan Growth 30.00% 5.40% ~2.71 ~.87 ~.29 -3.47 





• Weight Weight Feetor WeIght OcunlcBank 'C WAInht 
II 
I 2005 2008 2007 2006 2009 2yrAve Score Own_hiD 25.00% 4.00% 50. 75.00 62.50 2.50 
10 Corporate G.ovemance 40.00% 16.00% Non-Executive > Executive 25.00% 4.00% 52. 52.94 52.94 2.12 
I Audit Committees 25.00% 4.00% 200. 200.00 200.00 
6.00 
Qualitative F8CIIIn 40% 
Related Party Transactions 25.00% 4.00% 100. 75.00 87.50 3.50 
MIIket Shant 40.00% 16.00% 
Per Total Assels 50.00% 8.00% 6. 10.21 8.58 0.69 
Per Total DeDDsIts 50.00% 8.00% 8 . 10.4 9.42 0.75 ... 
Financial R_ 10.00% 4.00% Anendallnfcnr!aIion Timeliness 100.00% 4.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.00 '" .II RewlldarY Envl_ent 10.00% 4.00% SUpport from CenIraI Bank 100.00% 4.00% 25.00 50.00 37.50 1.50 
i Prulltabillty 15.00% 9.00% Ooeretina orofit arior to imDainnenlSitolai assets 50.00% 4.50% 3.53 2.67 3.10 0.14 Net Income before tax/toIallncome 50.00% 4.50% 35.40 40.25 37.63 1.70 
~ .lcluldltv 22.50% 13.50% Talal llenoRits I Talal Loans 100:00% 13.50% 305.44 202.89 254.16 34.31 U 
~ Quanltatlve Factors 60% Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% 
Tier 1 Rallo % 50.00% 6.75% 18.50 36.00 27.25 1.84 
J Shareholders ECIIJIto.(Talal Assels 50.00% 6.75% 10.10 21.45 15.78 1.06 EtIIclencv 10.00% 6.00% Cosillnc:ome Ratio 100:00% 6.00% -69.03 -61.40 -65.22 -3.31 
AsHtQuaI~ 30.00% 18.00% 
NPls/Gross Loans 70.00% 12.60% -4.11 -3.23 -3.67 -0.46 
% Chanoa in Loan Growth 30.00% 5.40% -27.10 -242.31 -134.71 -7.27 












Stanbic IBTC Bank 
c.t8gory Ove ... 11 
Sub-
Ov .... 11 
FKtor Stanblc IBTC Bank 
1 WeIght Weight Welaht Weight 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2vrAve Sco ... z OwnershlD 25.00% 4.00% O.OC 25.IX . 12.50 0.50 
) Corporate Governance 40.00% 16.00% 
Non-Executlve > executive 25.00% 4.00% 66.61 66.6< 66.67 2.67 
Audit Committees 25.00% 4.00% 2oo.OC 2oo.OC 200.00 8.00 
Qualitative Factors 40% 
Related PartY Transactions 25.00% 4.00% 1OO.OC 1OO.OC 100.00 4.00 
Malbt Sha ... 40.00% 16.00% Per Total Assets 50.00% 8.00% 2.81; 2.31: 2.82 0.21 
Per Total DeposIts 50.00% 8.00% 1.<1/: 1.51 1.46 0.12 
J Financial Reaortlno 10.00% 4.00% Financlallnbmatlon Timeliness 100.00% 4.00% 1OO.OC 1oo.OC 100.00 4.00 R.auletorv Environment 10.00% 4.00% Suooort from Central Bank 100.00% 4.00% O.OC O.OC 0.00 0.00 
! Profitability 15.00% 9.00% I nmfI nrior to imDAlnnentsllotal assets 50.00% 4.50% 5.18 5.71 5.44 0.24 
8 Net Income before tax/totallncome 50.00% 
4.50% 63.94 46.83 55.38 2.49 
LlauldItY 22.50% 13.50% otal D800sIsI Total Loans 100]10% 13.50% 112.95 133.37 123.16 16.63 
I Quanitative Factors 60% Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% rter 1 RatIol%r 50.00% 6.75% 44.70 46.50 45.60 3.08 lhBrahokIers Eoulhlfl otalAAAAl" 50.00% 875% 31.12 27.43 29.28 1.98 
I&. Efflclencv 10.00% 6.00% DtJlncoma RatIo 100.00'11. 6.00% -33.85 -45.78 -39.81 -2.39 
Asset Quality 30.00% 18.00% NPLsIGross Loans 70.00% 12.60% 
-21.53 -14.00 -17.n -2.24 
% Chanoe in Loan Growth 30.00% 5.40% -13.09 -19.69 -16.39 ~.89 
100% 100% [Total ScoI1I 38.40 
Capitec Bank Limited [South African Bank] 
Category Ove ... 11 
Sub-
Ov .... 11 




2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 3vrAve Score 
Ownershln 25.00% 4.00% - -
i Corporate Governance 40.00% 16.00% Non-Executlve > ExecutIve 25.00% 4.00% - -Audit COmmittees 25.00% 4.00% - -
J Qualitative Factors 40% 
Related Party Transactions 25.00% 4.00% - -
Malbt Share 40.00% 16.00% 
Per Total Assets 50.00% 8.00% - -
Per Total DeoosIIs 50.00% 8.00% - -
...: Financial Reaortlno 10.00% 4.00% Flnanclallnformatlon Timeliness 100.00% 4.00% .I - -Reoulatorv Environment 10.00% 4.00% SuDDOrt from Cemal Bank 100.00% 4.00% - -
I Profitability 15.00% 9.00% O.-atinD nmfII DriDr to im .... irmentsltotai assets 50.00% 4.50% 65.83 61.36 46.45 57.88 2.60 Net Income before tax/totallnoome 50.00% 4.50% 20.18 24.71 28.39 24.43 1.10 
lJ Jauldltv 22.50% 13.50% otal DaMaIts I Total Loans 100.00% 13.50% 135.02 130.87 111.61 125.83 16.99 
Quanltatlve Factors 60% Capital Adequacy 22.50% 13.50% 
TIer 1 Ratio % 50.00% 6.75% 84.00 78.90 83.40 82.10 5.54 
Shareholders Eoullv/1 0181 Assets 50.00% 6.75% 56.79 45.06 50.99 51.61 3.46 
Etllclencv 10.00% 6.00% Cost/lncome Ratio 100.00% 6.00% -79.82 -75.29 -71.61 -75.57 -4.53 
Msat Quality 30.00% 18.00% NPLs/Gross Loans 70.00% 12.60% -12.86 -16.93 - 1.88 -13.82 -1.74 
% Chanaein Loan Growth 30.00% 5.40% -54.14 -118.70 -76.67 -63.17 -4.49 
Total ScoI1I 18.95 
-114 -
